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ARTICLE
THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE:
DISAGGREGATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION
INTENT STANDARD
Bertrall L. Ross II*
Challenges under the Equal Protection Clause require proof of
intentional discrimination. Though rarely questioned by legal scholars or
the courts, that conventional account cannot explain the success of equal
protection challenges to electoral structures that dilute the vote of racial
minorities. In the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on vote dilution,
the Court has invalidated local electoral structures under the Equal
Protection Clause to the extent that they deprive African Americans of the
opportunity for effective representation in the political process. The Court
has reached its decisions despite the absence of any proof of intentional
discrimination in the adoption of the electoral structures.
In the vote dilution cases, the Supreme Court is best understood as
having applied a critical alternative principle underlying the Equal
Protection Clause: the representative equality principle. Using this
principle, which originated in the reapportionment cases of the 1960s, the
Court has invalidated structures that undermine two preconditions of
representative government: majority rule and effective representation of
minorities in the political process. It has done so even in the absence of
evidence of intentional discrimination.
The idea that courts should use judicial review to strengthen the political
processes underlying democratic representation is well known. That form
of judicial review is termed “representation-reinforcing judicial review.”
In this Article, I argue that the vote dilution cases, along with the
reapportionment cases, constitute a distinctive form of judicial review, one
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that is a necessary precursor to representation-reinforcing judicial review.
This form should be understood as “representation-structuring judicial
review.” By policing the basic structures of representative democracy, the
Court protects majority rule and minorities’ effective representation in the
political process. In the absence of these critical preconditions, there might
well be little representation to “reinforce.”
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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, eight black residents of Burke County, Georgia, challenged an
at-large system of representation in which the five members of the county
board of commissioners were selected through countywide elections.1 The

1. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 615–16 (1982). Rogers v. Lodge is the most
recent constitutional vote dilution case decided by the Supreme Court. Since Rogers, the
Court has addressed vote dilution challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
which prohibits the imposition or application of voting standards that “result[] in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006); see, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874 (1994); Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Luke P. McLoughlin,
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and
Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006) (describing how “[t]he
creation of a broad avenue of relief under the [Voting Rights Act] essentially eliminated the
claims of ‘unconstitutional’ minority vote dilution [and t]he practice of seeking relief under
the statute instead of the Constitution quickly became the norm”).
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county was majority-black, but no African American had ever been elected
to the county board of commissioners.2 The chances for the election of
white representatives who would be responsive to the interests of black
voters were remote, at best.
The reasons for this unresponsiveness were related to the political and
social context surrounding the operation of the at-large scheme in Burke
County, which represented a familiar pattern across many parts of the
South. A history of voting discrimination meant blacks constituted only 38
percent of registered voters.3 For an ordinary minority, this vote share
would be enough to influence elections and policymaking. But African
Americans in Burke County were not an ordinary minority that could either
individually, or in coalitions with other groups, influence elections. Whites
in Burke County rarely voted for black candidates or candidates who would
be responsive to the interests of the black community.4 Moreover, the
absence of competition between political parties in the one-party
Democratic South reduced electoral competition for votes—the primary
structural incentive for parties to include the African American minority in
the political process.5 This combination of factors deprived blacks of the
opportunity to influence the outcome of elections and left them politically
marginalized.6 Consequently, the Burke County Board of Commissioners
was generally unresponsive to the needs of the black community—from the
seemingly mundane issues of road paving in predominantly black
neighborhoods, to the more consequential failure to remedy black
complaints about school and grand jury segregation.7 The result was a
disproportionately poor, undereducated, and underserved black community
with limited ability to effectively influence political affairs in the county.8
In a surprise ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the at-large system
in Burke County violated the Equal Protection Clause.9 In Rogers v. Lodge,
the Court invalidated the at-large plan despite the absence of any evidence
2. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (stating that black candidates had run for office in the
Burke County Commission, but none had ever won); CHARLES S. BULLOCK III & RONALD
KEITH GADDIE, THE TRIUMPH OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 83–85 (2009) (describing the
lag in black voter registration through the 1980s); McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 67–74
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (describing the history of voting laws
in Georgia that were designed to disenfranchise African Americans).
3. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615.
4. Id. at 623; McDonald et al., supra note 2, at 84 (describing voting in Georgia as
ordinarily polarized along racial lines during this period).
5. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624–25 (describing the exclusion of blacks from the
Democratic Party). See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880–1910, at 238–65 (1974) (offering an explanation for the emergence of the one-party
South in the years following Reconstruction and continuing through the 1980s).
6. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (“Voting along racial lines allows those elected to
ignore black interests without fear of political consequences.”).
7. See id. at 625–26.
8. See id. at 626 (describing the depressed socioeconomic status of blacks in Burke
county).
9. See id. at 627; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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of intentional discrimination in the county’s adoption of the scheme in
1911.10 Instead, the Court focused on the consequences of the districting
scheme in the political and social context in which it operated.11 Since the
scheme operated to deprive blacks of the opportunity to effectively
influence the political process, it violated the Equal Protection Clause.12
Why was Rogers a surprise? Largely because the holding in the case
seemed to directly contradict the equal protection standard that the Court
developed over the six years immediately prior to the decision. In a famous
trilogy of cases in the late 1970s—Washington v. Davis,13 Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,14 and
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney15—the Court
determined that, to successfully challenge a law under the Equal Protection
Clause, litigants had to show that a state actor intended to discriminate
against a particular class of individuals.16 Under this model, which
suggested a search for an individual perpetrator, the Court required either
direct evidence of discriminatory intent in the form of testimonial
statements or circumstantial evidence of discrimination from the context
surrounding the adoption or active reaffirmation of a law.17 Such evidence
was not even presented in Rogers. In fact, the Court in Rogers never
pointed to any particular perpetrator of discrimination.
In the present, Rogers remains a puzzle because it fits uncomfortably
with what has since become the dominant account of equal protection.
Resting on the trilogy of Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, this
conventional account depicts equal protection as a standard that only
invalidates laws motivated by intentional racial discrimination. Rather than
trying to reconcile the equal protection standard applied in Rogers with that
applied in the Davis trilogy, scholars typically ignore Rogers.18 The few
who do pay any sustained attention to the case either describe it as an
outlier, implicitly suggesting that the Court erred in its application of the
10. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626–27 (adopting the district court’s finding that the
electoral system was “neutral in origin”).
11. See id. at 624–27.
12. See id. at 627.
13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
15. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
16. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
17. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–68.
18. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Barbara J. Flagg,
Enduring Principles: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 935
(1994); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Eva Patterson et al., The Id, The Ego,
and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to
Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008);
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 494 (2003); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
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intent standard,19 or treat it as an example of the Court giving greater
scrutiny to interests or rights considered fundamental.20
In this Article, I argue that the standard employed in Rogers should not
be ignored. Far from an insignificant relic, it is best understood as the
Court’s most recent application of a critical alternative principle underlying
the Equal Protection Clause: the representative equality principle. The
conventional account suggests that Davis and its progeny established a
universal intent standard applicable to all discrimination claims challenging
facially neutral state actions under the Equal Protection Clause.21 This is
not the case. Instead, the Court has applied an alternative standard of proof
that I refer to as an “operative effects” standard to challenges against
electoral structures that allegedly undermine the structural mandate of
representative equality. Under this operative effects standard, the Court
measures the constitutionality of a voting scheme from the democratic
effects of its current operation rather than the intent underlying its past
adoption. The equal protection right protected by Rogers is therefore not
simply a right to be free from biased decision making in the adoption of an
electoral scheme. It is a structurally driven right to effective representation
in the political process for politically marginalized minorities.
The operative effects standard reflected in Rogers should be understood
as evolving from the reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, when the
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require that every
individual’s vote be equally weighted through equally apportioned
legislative districts.22 The familiar standard established in those cases was
19. See Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2012) (manuscript at 76), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1920418#%23 (suggesting that the decision in Rogers was a response to
congressional criticism of a prior case, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which
Congress ultimately overturned statutorily with an amendment to the Voting Rights Act);
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric,
86 GEO. L.J. 279, 313–15 (1997) (“One can only speculate . . . as to the legacy of
[Rogers].”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (acknowledging that
the Court in Rogers had employed a different standard of proof than the Court had applied in
Feeney, but never offering a reason for the distinction).
20. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1998)
(arguing that the substance of the right being protected explains the Court’s use of a more
lenient standard in Rogers); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1136–37 (1989) (arguing that the Court applies a different intent
standard in voting cases because of “the importance of the individual interest at stake”); see
also infra Part II.
21. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, at 1509
(2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that in Davis, the Court “announced that henceforth every lawsuit
involving constitutional claims of racial discrimination directed at facially race-neutral rules
would be conducted as a search for a bigoted decision-maker”); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black
Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 150 (“Since its landmark decision in
Washington v. Davis . . . the Supreme Court has consistently held that in order to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination, a litigant must show
that the state had engaged in purposeful, or intentional, discrimination.”).
22. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); see also infra Part II.B.
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one-person, one-vote, a right that the Court at the time suggested was
personal and individual.23 However, in the process of construing the Equal
Protection Clause to require one-person, one-vote, the Court also
established the structural mandate that would drive the evaluation of
whether the personal right was being violated—the mandate of fair and
effective representation in the political process.24 This mandate developed
over time to require not only that majorities rule, but that majorities also
account for and consider the interests of minorities in the representative
process. I refer to this mandate as the “representative equality” principle.
This Article makes the case that the representative equality principle is an
already established, and normatively attractive interpretation of equal
protection in the voting context—one that deserves full recognition
alongside the discriminatory intent interpretation of equal protection.
Recovering the representative equality principle has important
implications for substantive constitutional law concerning minority voting
rights. First, there is the question of the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,25 which rests in part on the issue of the extent of
Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. An account of
the Equal Protection Clause as merely prohibiting intentional discrimination
suggests that congressional authority to enact the Voting Rights Act is
questionable, since the Act invalidates a whole host of state actions that
would be found constitutional under the intent standard.26 However, if the
representative equality principle is recognized as a valid interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, Congress has the authority to enforce that
principle by barring electoral structures that undermine effective
representation.
Second, there is the question of whether it is permissible for jurisdictions
to consider race in drawing electoral district lines when the purpose is to
secure opportunities for the effective representation of politically
marginalized groups. Some scholars have argued that the use of race in this
context is inconsistent with the colorblindness principle and therefore
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2006).
26. Several articles have been written assessing the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act under the assumption that the Equal Protection Clause is exclusively animated by
the antidiscrimination principle. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 125 (2010); John Matthew Guard, “Impotent Figureheads”? State Sovereignty,
Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act after Lopez v.
Monterey County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329 (1999); Pamela S.
Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998) (arguing for the continued constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act under the Boerne standard); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749–51 (1998) (questioning the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act); Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Constitutionality after City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 609 (2004); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003).
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unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.27 Understanding the
Equal Protection Clause as also encompassing a representative equality
principle complicates this account, as the issue then pits two constitutional
principles against each other.
Because I focus on identifying and situating the representative equality
principle within the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, this
Article does not flesh out the arguments for the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act and of race-conscious districting. Nonetheless, this
project takes the first step toward using the representative equality principle
to resolve these controversies by building the necessary doctrinal and
theoretical foundations.
Rethinking the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause also
has important implications for our understanding of the proper judicial role
in structuring representative democracy. The Court’s elaboration of the
mandate of representative equality is one example of an important judicial
function that was anticipated, but not well theorized, by political process
theorists.28 I describe that function as “representation-structuring judicial
review.”
Political process theory, most prominently developed by John Hart Ely,
seeks to reconcile judicial review with democracy.29 In particular, process
theory provides a justification for the unelected and unaccountable
judiciary’s role in the invalidation of democratically enacted laws.30
According to process theory, laws enacted through a defective process
suffer a democratic legitimacy deficit; as a result, the invalidation of such
laws can in fact reinforce representative government.31 Equal protection
scholars further argue that the courts, in applying the discriminatory intent
standard, correct democratic defects resulting from impure government
decision making—decision making motivated by animus toward a minority.
In doing so they protect minorities and buttress a government that is
representative of all interests.32
The vote dilution cases demonstrate that process theory, as currently
understood, is incomplete. In order to ensure a political process that is
properly representative in that it is inclusive of all interests, process
theory’s suggested role for judicial review must extend beyond mere
27. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 143-67 (2009); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative
Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of
Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 599–604 (1995). But see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan &
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202–04 (1996);
Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 247–48 (1997); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and
[Mis]representation: Part II—Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote,
43 HOW. L.J. 405, 443–44 (2000).
28. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77–88 (1980).
29. See id. at 101–03.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715
(1985) (describing process theory’s approach to resolving the countermajoritarian difficulty).
32. See infra Part III.
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reinforcement of representative government at the back end. Judicial
review must also structure the government process so that it is
representative at the front end. In this role, the courts are responsible for
correcting defects in the basic electoral structure underlying representative
government—defects that can only be ascertained through an assessment of
the operation of an electoral scheme, and not through the intent of those
adopting it.33 Ely posits that courts can serve this structural role by
enforcing other constitutional safeguards, largely outside of the Equal
Protection Clause: maintaining constitutional checks on majority tyranny—
through the preservation of separation of powers and federalism—and by
ensuring that the interests of groups in the majority coalition are tied to
those of minorities through generally applicable laws.34
I argue that Ely’s suggested means for structuring representative
government to account for minorities’ interests are ultimately incomplete.
Process theory’s proposed constitutional checks on majority power,
especially the strategy of ensuring that the interests of the majority coalition
are tied to those of the minority through generally applicable laws, are
premised on an assumption that members of the minority and the majority
will be similarly situated and similarly impacted by the law. However,
many minorities, especially politically marginalized ones, are vulnerable to
generally applicable laws that impose disparate harms on them because they
are differently situated from members of the majority coalition. While the
egalitarian goal of process theory clearly does not require that minorities be
guaranteed equal outcomes from laws, it does require the government to
account for and consider all interests in the enactment of such laws. And
generally applicable laws do not guarantee such accounting for and
consideration of interests, particularly when the politically disempowered
minority is differently situated, and therefore differently affected, by those
laws.
The Court’s vote dilution doctrine is one means of more fully reconciling
majority rule with the protection of minority interests. The Court’s review
in vote dilution cases is aimed at structural impediments to opportunities for
effective representation in the political process. The judicial invalidation of
electoral structures that prevent minorities from having their interests
considered and accounted for in the policymaking process is thus an
additional process-based mechanism for attaining a government that is
representative of all interests. Scholars have not yet fully appreciated this
representation-structuring aspect of vote dilution doctrine.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. In the first Part, I describe the
inconsistency between the Court’s equal protection intent standard in the
Davis trilogy and the standard employed in the vote dilution cases. I show
that the evidentiary standards in these two lines of cases are distinct, with
the Court in the Davis trilogy focused on identifying a perpetrator of
discrimination, while in the vote dilution cases the Court focused on how
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part III.
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the laws in question operated in practice. I conclude this Part by arguing
that previous scholarly attempts to make sense of the inconsistency fail to
adequately explain the distinction.
In Part II, I argue that the standard employed in the vote dilution cases,
which I call the “operative effects standard,” is best understood as being
derived from the reapportionment cases decided in the 1960s and early
1970s. In these two sets of cases, the Court restructured the pluralist
marketplace to protect both majorities and minorities based on a
representative equality principle. It is important to note that my goal in
reconstructing the origins and development of this principle is not to try to
accurately channel the justices’ actual thinking or motivations for deciding
these cases as they did. Instead, my focus is on the jurisprudence produced
by the Court. I therefore seek an interpretation of the decisions that “best
fits” the broader doctrinal landscape and argue that the representative
equality principle offers the best explanatory fit.35
Finally, in Part III, I argue that this interpretation of the vote dilution
cases rests on a very strong normative foundation. Although revising the
baseline rules and structures of electoral representation to accord with the
representative equality principle involves the Court in a substantive value
choice regarding the form that our democracy will take, such a choice can
be justified under a process-theoretic account of the proper judicial role in a
democracy. The Court in these cases is engaging in representationstructuring judicial review in which it is establishing the essential
preconditions for representative government and ultimately for the
operation of a process-based, representation-reinforcing judicial review. If
the Court did not play this role, it is not at all clear that other institutional
actors would be able to fill the gap.
I. AN UNEXPLAINED EXCEPTION TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION
INTENT STANDARD
In this Part, I examine how the Court in a trilogy of cases beginning with
Davis reaffirmed an equal protection intent standard that invalidated laws
only upon proof that a state actor had a discriminatory motive in the
adoption of a law. I show how in doing so, the Court specifically rejected
an alternative framework that would have looked to the discriminatory
consequences of the operation of the law. I then argue that two important
vote dilution cases decided shortly after this trilogy fit awkwardly within
this intent-based evidentiary framework, and instead more closely accord
35. This methodological approach draws on the framework that Ronald Dworkin
employs for how judges should decide hard cases. He explains:
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding . . . a case . . . to think of himself as an
author in the chain of common law. He knows that other judges have decided
cases that, although not exactly like his case, deal with related problems; he
must think of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then
continue, according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story
as good as it can be.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238–39 (1986).
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with the alternative framework that the Court specifically rejected in the
trilogy. I conclude with a description of two scholarly attempts to solve this
puzzle, contending that they are both unsuccessful.
A. The Trilogy and the Reaffirmation of the Intent Standard
The usual scholarly starting point for what has been described as the
equal protection antidiscrimination principle is the much-scrutinized case of
Davis. In that case, the Court held that the evidentiary burden for equal
protection challengers was to show that a law or action was motivated by
the discriminatory intent of a particular state actor—or “perpetrator”—of
discrimination.36
The importance of Davis lies not only in its requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate the discriminatory intent of one or more perpetrators, but also
in its rejection of an alternative evidentiary framework that the Court had
developed in its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act37 in the decade preceding the case.38 This
alternative framework denied the relevance of the perpetrator’s motives to
the assessment of the constitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection
Clause in part because of the difficulty of ascertaining the motive of a
collective body and the futility of invalidating statutes on the basis of

36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). This evidentiary burden did not
originate in Davis. Rather, the Court had employed a similar standard in varying form in
deciding challenges to alleged discriminatory jury selection and racial gerrymandering since
the early years of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286
(1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942);
see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57 (1964) (applying a perpetrator intent
standard to the race-based drawing of district lines); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
341 (1960) (applying what the Court later interpreted to be a perpetrator intent standard to
the race-conscious drawing of district lines); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal
Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511,
538–64 (describing the history of the Court’s jury selection cases); Haney López, supra note
19, at 8 (“The Court from its earliest years recognized that judging state conduct for its
constitutionality often required evaluating government purposes.”); Caleb Nelson, Judicial
Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1818–50 (2008) (describing the
relevance of legislative purpose in the Court’s assessment of the constitutionality of laws in
the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s); Joseph Tussman and Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 358 (1949). The Court,
however, has historically addressed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges to laws
that allegedly deny the vote on account of race under a standard that has tended to focus on
evidence from the operation of the law. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939); Myers v.
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364–65
(1915).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
38. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (explaining that the focus in
other cases during the prior decade decided under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Fifteenth Amendment “was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation
which led the States to behave as they did”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–
30 (1971) (establishing the alternative evidentiary framework in a Title VII challenge to a
corporation’s employment promotion practices).
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discriminatory intent, since such laws could always be reenacted without
such a motive.39
More importantly, the alternative evidentiary framework, as developed in
the statutory context of Title VII, also seemed to accept disparate impact as
sufficient for a prima facie finding of discrimination.40 This framework
incorporated a baseline of equality of opportunity as the measure for
discrimination. It also focused attention away from whether a perpetrator
intended to deprive individuals of equal opportunity to whether the law
itself, combined with other structural sources of inequality, operated in a
way that deprived individuals of such opportunity. For example, in the
central case establishing this alternative evidentiary framework, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., the Court invalidated, under Title VII, a power company’s
requirement that employees either have a high school diploma or pass an
intelligence test to be promoted.41 It did so even though it found that the
employer had been trying to improve employment opportunities for blacks
by providing financial support for employees seeking high school
training.42 The Court determined that the employment test was nonetheless
prima facie discriminatory because the promotion criteria operated in a
context in which blacks had historically received inferior education that
resulted in their disparate exclusion from promotion opportunities.43

39. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25 (suggesting that the discriminatory motive of the
state actor was irrelevant in a case addressing an equal protection challenge to a city’s
closure of formerly segregated pools after a court order that it operate these pools on a
desegregated basis); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.367, 383 (1968) (rejecting a motivebased challenge to a law on the grounds that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter”); see also Ely, supra note 28, at 1212–17 (elaborating on
the concerns associated with the motive inquiry of ascertainability and futility and
identifying an additional concern of disutility in which the Court invalidates laws that are
“laudable in operational terms simply because the process which produced them was
disreputable”).
40. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (explaining that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
“practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices”). The Court had, a year earlier, signaled the importance of
discriminatory impact to the constitutional inquiry without going so far as to hold that such
impact could alone be the basis for finding a state decision unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 220, 224 (noting the lack of disparate impact
resulting from the decision of the city to close pools while also announcing that the
motivation for the decision was not relevant to the constitutional inquiry). But see, e.g.,
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (“[T]he differentiating factor between
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to
segregate.”); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (“The acceptance of
appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among
the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the
treatment might be.”); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 544–48 (1977) (describing the pre-Davis
uncertainty around whether discriminatory purpose or effect was the proper equal protection
standard).
41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
42. Id. at 432.
43. Id. at 430–31.
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In the trilogy of cases beginning with Davis and continuing through
Arlington Heights, and Feeney, the Court changed course. In particular, it
reaffirmed that the intent of the perpetrator, rather than the consequences of
the operation of the law, was central to the assessment of whether a state
action violated the Equal Protection Clause.44 In the most extreme version
of the perpetrator intent standard articulated in Feeney, a challenger to a
state action would need to show that the decision maker “selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”45 This
evidentiary requirement of perpetrator intent, the Court conceded, was
greater than the burden it had established under Title VII.46 But it
explained that the Constitution requires the challenger to a state action to
prove something more than the disparate impact of that action.47 This shift
to the perpetrator intent standard had an obvious and significant effect on
the outcome of cases.
For example, when the Court addressed the validity of a qualifying test
for a position as a police officer in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department in Davis, it upheld the test. It did so even though the test
operated to disproportionately exclude blacks from officer positions
because of the inferior education that blacks received in Washington D.C.48
The Court upheld the test because the Police Department had shown good
faith in actively recruiting blacks to integrate the police force.49 According
to the Court, this evidence contradicted any argument that the police
department intended to discriminate against blacks in the administration of
44. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.”). Despite this assertion, it is fairly clear that the Court in Davis was reaffirming an
evidentiary standard that it had veered away from in cases decided during the prior decade.
See Haney López, supra note 19, at 23 (describing Davis as a rejection of the structural
implications of Griggs); Siegel, supra note 19, at 1134 (describing the Court’s decision in
Davis as one in which it announced its “new-found commitment to motive review”). The
Court reaffirmed this standard without explaining why discriminatory motive was relevant
and without adequately reconciling prior case law. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 113 (1977) (explaining that the Court in Davis and Arlington Heights
“[never] articulate[d] why motive is relevant in constitutional adjudication”); Larry G.
Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions:
A Motivation Theory of the
Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1104 (1978)
(criticizing the Court’s confused reconciliation of Palmer v. Thompson with its decision in
Davis).
45. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
46. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953,
963 (1993) (describing the Davis intent standard as a “significant departure” from the Griggs
standard).
47. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”).
48. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (explaining that the difference in test passage rates was properly attributed to “the
long history of educational deprivation, primarily due to segregated schools, for blacks”).
49. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.
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the test.50 In other words, even though the test operated discriminatorily,
the challengers had failed to prove the discriminatory intent of the
perpetrator.
For the first time, the Court in the trilogy also clearly identified the
evidence that would be relevant to proving discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause. Rather than looking to evidence from the context
surrounding the operation of the state practice, only evidence from the
context of the decision to adopt the state practice would be relevant to
finding a violation of the intent standard.51 While disparate impact
remained relevant, only in extremely rare circumstances would it be
dispositive.52 Instead, dispositive evidence would have to be in the form of
a direct testimonial statement in which one or more state actors during the
decision-making process expressed animus towards the group.53
Alternatively, discriminatory intent could be inferred from circumstantial
evidence such as the sequence of events leading up to the decision,
deviations from the normal decision-making procedures, or the decision
maker’s failure to consider factors ordinarily relevant to the decision.54
When evaluating the constitutionality of a housing ordinance that
operated in a manner that disproportionately disadvantaged racial minorities
in Arlington Heights, the Court, applying these evidentiary factors, upheld
50. See id. at 246 (“We think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts
of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers . . . negated any inference
that the Department discriminated on the basis of race . . . .”).
51. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.”).
52. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”) (emphasis
omitted).
53. See id.
54. See id. Criticism of this motive inquiry is widespread. See, e.g., Gayle Binion,
“Intent” and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 397
(describing the barrier of proving intent as impenetrable); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (1978) (“Dual requirements [of fault and causation]
place on the victim the nearly impossible burden of isolating the particular conditions of
discrimination produced by and mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified
blameworthy perpetrator, regardless of whether other conditions of discrimination, caused by
other perpetrators, would have to be remedied for the outcome of the case to make any
difference at all.”); Lawrence, supra note 18, at 319 (suggesting that the intent standard
“places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the
dispute”); see also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 18, at 1160 (explaining that a primary
source of dissatisfaction with the equal protection standard is the difficulty of proving
discriminatory purpose).
It is especially difficult under this standard to redress
discrimination motivated by unconscious bias. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural
Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Unconscious
bias . . . generates inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to
solve.”); Lawrence, supra note 18, at 322 (explaining that much of racially discriminatory
activity “is influenced by unconscious racial motivation” and that a standard “requiring proof
of conscious or intentional motivation . . . ignores much of what we understand about how
the human mind works”).
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the law because “there [was] little about the sequence of events leading up
to the decision that would spark suspicion.”55 In addition, statements from
the administrative record indicated to the Court that there were other nonracial reasons for adopting the ordinance.56 Finally, the Court concluded
that testimony of a board member responsible for the decision to adopt the
ordinance failed to provide any support for an inference of discriminatory
purpose.57 As in Davis, the lack of perpetrator intent once again trumped
any concern about the discriminatory operation of the statute in the Court’s
decision to uphold the law.
Finally, in Feeney, the Court rejected as irrelevant the fact that a
Massachusetts veterans’ job preference operated in a context in which
women had historically been disproportionately excluded from military
service.58 As a result of this history, the preference in the words of the
author of the majority opinion, Justice Stewart, “operate[d] overwhelmingly
to the advantage of males.”59 Rather than rely on this powerful evidence of
the discriminatory operation of the preference scheme linked to ongoing
discriminatory practices, the Court looked instead exclusively to the context
surrounding the decision to adopt and reaffirm the veterans’ job preference
to determine its constitutionality.60 The Court identified as the dispositive
question, “whether the [challenger to the preference] ha[d] shown that a
gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped
the Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”61 From this starting
point, the majority determined that the legislative decision to establish the
veterans’ preference in the period after the Civil War and its subsequent
decision to modify and reaffirm the preference during World War I and
World War II was motivated by a desire to protect veterans and not a desire
to discriminate against female job applicants.62 To support this conclusion,

55. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269.
56. Id. at 270.
57. Id.
58. See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 489 (D. Mass. 1976) (describing
the historical limitations on the service of women in the military).
59. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
60. In doing so, the Court gave a nod to the Arlington Heights factors in a footnote,
explaining that “[p]roof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective
factors, several of which were outlined in [Arlington Heights].” Id. at 279 n.24. The Court
goes on to explain that the focus of the inquiry is to ascertain “[w]hat a legislature or any
official entity is ‘up to.’” Id. The majority continued by explaining that
when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group are as
inevitable as the gender-based consequences of [the preference scheme], a strong
inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn. But in
this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a working tool,
not a synonym for proof. When, as here, the impact is essentially an unavoidable
consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to be
legitimate, and when, as here, the statutory history and all of the available evidence
affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the inference simply fails to ripen into
proof.
Id. at 279 n.25.
61. Id. at 276.
62. Id. at 278–80. Specifically, the Court held:
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the majority pointed to the good faith attempts by the Massachusetts
legislatures that modified the law “to include as many military women as
possible within the scope of the preference.”63 Lacking evidence of
discriminatory motivation, the Court upheld the veterans preference. In the
process, it disregarded both the gender disparities resulting from the
preference and the fact that it operated in a context in which women still
suffered from discrimination in their opportunities to serve in the military,
and upheld the preference.64
One of the Court’s principal justifications for its movement away from an
evidentiary standard that invalidated laws on the basis of their operation
was that the standard lacked an appropriate constitutional baseline to
measure when a law operated to discriminate against members of a
particular group.65
Any standard that focuses on disproportionate
disadvantage has to answer the question: disproportionate disadvantage as
compared to what? A logical baseline for measuring a violation of equal
protection is equality of outcome, a baseline that the Court seemingly
accepted in developing the alternative framework in the Title VII context.66
According to this baseline, any state action that impacts one group
differently from another group would be presumptively discriminatory
unless justified. The problem with a pure discriminatory impact standard is
that it would potentially subject to strict scrutiny every state action unless
that action achieved the nearly impossible task of equal outcomes for all
groups.67 To protect against this danger, the alternative evidentiary
framework required that the challenger of an employment practice produce
evidence of discrimination from the context in which the practice operated
to show that the difference in treatment was not due to random chance or
reasons unrelated to surrounding structural discrimination.68
The Court rejected an equality of outcome baseline in the trilogy. It did
so, however, without acknowledging that the baseline did not simply
require equality of outcomes, but operated in conjunction with an
The District Court’s conclusion that the absolute veterans’ preference was not
originally enacted or subsequently reaffirmed for the purpose of giving an
advantage to males as such necessarily compels the conclusion that the State
intended nothing more than to prefer ‘veterans.’ Given this finding, simple logic
suggests that an intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at
work in this law.
Id. at 277.
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id. at 279–81.
65. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (expressing concern about the far
reach of a standard that invalidated a statute designed to serve neutral ends that in practice
benefited or burdened one race more than another).
66. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (describing as the
objective of Title VII, the “achieve[ment of] equality of employment opportunities and [the]
remov[al of] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees”).
67. See Ely, supra note 28, at 1258.
68. For example, an employer could defend an employment practice that had a disparate
impact on a minority group by showing a business necessity for the practice. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 429–30.
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assessment of the context surrounding the operation of a practice. Instead,
the Court simply announced that a discriminatory impact standard would
“render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes,
however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the
treatment might be.”69 It would therefore subject to potential invalidation
“a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white.”70 This impact standard was untenable,
according to the Court, because it would overly constrain the
constitutionally prescribed legislative prerogative to enact laws and it would
give the court too much power to invalidate these laws.71
In rejecting the disparate impact standard, the Court did not render
irrelevant evidence of disproportionate disadvantage. Such evidence could
serve as a starting point for an assessment of whether an actor was
motivated by discrimination in its enactment of a law.72 In fact, the Court
suggested that a massive disparate impact alone could potentially constitute
prima facie evidence of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.73
For example, voting criteria that prevent all but a few members of a
minority group from participating in an election or a licensing arrangement
that results in a denial for nearly every member of a minority group would
be presumptively unconstitutional.74 However, in practice it seemed the
state action would only be subject to heightened scrutiny if it could be
shown that there was no other explanation for it apart from discrimination.
Thus, even though only 1.8 percent of Massachusetts’s veterans were
women, the fact that the veterans preference could be explained as a law
intended to benefit veterans, and not simply to disadvantage women,
overcame the huge disproportionate impact to serve as a basis for upholding
the law.75
According to most equal protection scholars, the Davis trilogy
established a universal perpetrator intent standard that has been applied with
some slight variations to all challenges to alleged discriminatory state
actions. This is reflected in the antidiscrimination standard’s focus on the
subjective motivations of a particular state actor and the rejection of
particular substantive outcomes, such as equality, as a constitutional

69. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)).
70. Id. at 248.
71. See Flagg, supra note 18, at 952 (“[A]pplying strict scrutiny in all disparate impact
cases would engage the courts too extensively in overseeing social policy.”).
72. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”).
73. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.”).
74. See id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
75. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270 (1979).
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baseline for evaluating whether an action violates the Equal Protection
Clause.76
This conventional account of a uniform perpetrator intent standard is,
however, oversimplified. The Court has not reviewed all state actions
under the Equal Protection Clause in a universal manner. In the next
section, I argue that in two important voting cases decided shortly after the
trilogy, City of Mobile v. Bolden77 and Rogers, a majority of the Court
deviated from the two central features of the antidiscrimination principle
articulated in the trilogy. These cases involved challenges to districting
schemes that allegedly deprived minority groups of the opportunity to
influence the political process. In Bolden and Rogers, the Court focused on
evidence from the context surrounding the operation of the law, rather than
on the discriminatory intent of those adopting the law. I argue that, in
doing so, the Court employed an implicit substantive baseline for measuring
the scheme’s constitutionality. In the next Part, I argue that the metric the
Court used to decide the vote dilution cases is best understood as
representative equality.
B. The Vote Dilution Cases: An Exception to the Intent Standard
Almost immediately after deciding Feeney, the Court began to deviate
from the intent standard in two cases involving claims of vote dilution,
Bolden and Rogers. In these cases, black residents in two southern counties
alleged that an at-large scheme of electing county representatives deprived
them of the opportunity to influence the political process. Since the Davis
trilogy of cases was in the process of being decided as the two vote dilution
cases moved through the judicial pipeline, from the lower courts’
perspective the applicable equal protection standard was unclear.
Bolden involved a claim by black residents of Mobile County, Alabama,
that the at-large electoral system operating in the county violated the Equal
Protection Clause.78 The district court conceded that at the time the at-large
system was adopted in 1911, blacks had been effectively disenfranchised.
The at-large system therefore could not have been adopted with the intent of
diluting the black vote.79 Nonetheless, the court held that the at-large

76. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 23 (explaining that the Court in Davis
“renounce[d] a constitutional commitment to ensuring equitable outcomes”); Siegel, supra
note 19, at 1134–35 (describing the diminishing importance of disparate impact to the
Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis).
77. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
78. The at-large electoral system was also challenged under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60–61.
79. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). This effective
disenfranchisement resulted from exclusionary voting rules enacted by the Alabama
constitutional convention ten years earlier. Id. at 401. The county of Mobile also provided
nonracial justifications for the at-large scheme. Brief for Appellant at 28, Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (No. 77-1844), 1978 WL 207139, at *28 (describing the good government ends of the atlarge system as “provid[ing] citywide perspective and responsibility for actions equally to
each voter”).
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system unconstitutionally discriminated against the black residents of
Mobile County.80
Two theories of intent supported the district court’s finding of
discrimination. The first was that, while the county adopted the system in a
“race-proof situation,” the state actors that enacted the at-large scheme
could have foreseen its discriminatory impact.81 They should have
reasonably expected that blacks would one day be enfranchised and that an
at-large district, which would comprise a larger number of voters than
single member districts, would limit their opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice in a context of societal racism.82 The second theory was that,
even assuming the legislature that adopted the at-large system was not
discriminatorily motivated, the system currently was being retained in a
context that denied blacks the opportunity to be effectively represented in
the political process.83
By the time Bolden reached the Supreme Court, the Court in Feeney had
already rejected the district court’s first theory of discriminatory intent, that
such intent could be found when government actors reasonably could have
foreseen the discriminatory consequences of their actions.84 The Court in
Davis and Feeney also seemed to implicitly reject the district court’s second
theory, which indicated that discriminatory intent could be inferred from the
conscious, but passive, retention of a system with discriminatory effects.
Under a standard prohibiting the discriminatory retention of a policy with
obvious discriminatory effects, it would have been difficult to sustain the
decision to retain the promotion test employed in Davis. This test, like the
at-large scheme in Mobile County, had a discriminatory impact on black
candidates and operated in a context of great societal discrimination.85 It
would have also been difficult to sustain the veterans’ benefit in Feeney,
which dramatically and disproportionately benefitted men and operated in a
context in which women were still excluded from certain aspects of military
service.86
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the at-large system in Bolden, but
the justices were divided. A plurality of four justices explained that a
showing that less than a proportionate number of blacks had been elected to
the county commission would not be sufficient for a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.87 Instead, it would be necessary to show that the at-large
system was “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further

80. See Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 403.
81. Id. at 397.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 398 (“There is a ‘current’ condition of dilution of the black vote resulting
from intentional state legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional state
action.”).
84. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . .
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”).
85. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
87. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
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racial . . . discrimination.”88 Interestingly, in articulating this standard, the
plurality did not cite to any of the cases in the trilogy. Instead, the opinion
referenced earlier vote dilution cases that, through their focus on evidence
from the operation of the state electoral scheme, seemed to contradict the
perpetrator intent standard established in the trilogy.89
Although some scholars who have studied the discriminatory intent
standard suggest that the plurality opinion in Bolden fits neatly within the
framework adopted by the Court in the trilogy,90 it is not so clear that it
does. While the plurality found the evidence from the operation of the
electoral structure insufficient to show discrimination in the case,91 it did
not suggest that such evidence was irrelevant to the constitutional claim. In
fact, the plurality did not foreclose the possibility that such evidence could
be dispositive in the constitutional invalidation of an electoral scheme. The
standard that the plurality employed suggested that a law could be
invalidated if it simply was “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful
devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.”92
At the same time, the plurality did not critique the challengers’ failure to
offer any evidence, circumstantial or direct, that the at-large system was
adopted with an intent to discriminate against black voters. The plurality
could have simply rejected the claim for failing to provide such evidence, as
required under the standard established in the trilogy. Instead, the justices
carefully examined evidence from the operation of the at-large scheme and
explained why each piece of evidence, considered in isolation, was not a
sufficient basis for invalidating the scheme.
Perhaps most importantly—even assuming that despite the standard
articulated, the plurality in Bolden was simply following the evidentiary
framework established in the trilogy as scholars have suggested—the key
point is that the Bolden plurality could not secure a fifth vote for its
reasoning. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but suggested an
alternative, somewhat ambiguous, standard for evaluating claims of vote
dilution that would focus on whether the practice was “manifestly not the
product of . . . a traditional political decision.”93 Justice Blackmun also
concurred for the simple reason that he felt the district court remedy went
too far in invalidating the Mobile city commission system; he otherwise

88. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
89. See id. (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)). See generally Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). These cases are
discussed in greater detail in Part II.C.
90. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 42–44.
91. The Court determined that the at-large system was constitutional from the fact that
blacks could register, vote, and participate as candidates in the political process and from the
insufficiency of other evidence presented from the context of the operation of the at-large
system. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 73–74.
92. Id. at 66 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149).
93. See id. at 90–91 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin:
Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 528–29 (1996) (describing the
origin of Justice Stevens’s unique standard in his earlier appellate jurisprudence premised on
the view of the black community as just another ordinary interest group).
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found the reasoning in the dissent persuasive.94 For these justices—and in
particular for Justice Blackmun, who joined the majorities in each of the
trilogy cases—there seemed to be something different about vote dilution.
In fact, the dissenting justices in Bolden interpreted the plurality opinion
as employing a distinctive standard that looked to the context of the
operation of the at-large system—not to evidence of discriminatory intent at
the adoption of the scheme. They therefore agreed with the majority’s
formulation of the equal protection standard insofar as it looked to whether
the scheme was conceived or operated as a purposefully discriminatory
device, but ultimately disagreed with the plurality’s application of the
standard.95 For the dissenters, the plurality mistakenly relied upon certain
contextual factors in isolation, such as the fact that blacks were still able to
vote, register, and run for office. The plurality opinion seemed to indicate
that at-large systems with these characteristics would be insulated from
attack under the Equal Protection Clause. The dissenters found this
approach to be inconsistent with the “totality of the circumstances”
approach that had been articulated in prior vote dilution cases, which
focused on the operational context of the scheme in the evaluation of
discrimination.96 When properly examining the totality of evidentiary
factors surrounding the operation of the at-large system, the dissent argued
that the at-large system clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause.97
After Bolden, the contours of the equal protection standard applicable to
vote dilution claims were, at the very least, in flux. Even the “intent”
standard employed by the plurality in Bolden seemed to require something
different from that which had been required to prove a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause in the Davis trilogy.
In Rogers, a vote dilution case decided only two years after Bolden, a
majority of the Court again focused on the operation of the electoral system,
not the intent of those who adopted it.98 Other than the fact that the
challenge was brought against a county commission system in Burke
County, Georgia, rather than Mobile County, Alabama, there was little to
differentiate the context surrounding the adoption of the at-large system
challenged in Rogers. Both systems were adopted in 1911 at a time when,
because of prior voting restrictions, blacks were disenfranchised.99 Neither
of the at-large structures had undergone significant changes since their

94. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
95. See id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court did not question the vitality
of a standard established in White v. Regester that looked to the context of the operation of
the statute); see also infra Part II.C.
96. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 97–99.
98. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
99. At the time that both at-large schemes were erected, all blacks had been
disenfranchised in both counties. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.
Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In Georgia, the
Disenfranchisement Act of 1908 excluded most blacks from voting. See McDonald et al.,
supra note 2, at 69.
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adoption.100 There was no testimonial evidence that the legislators had
adopted the structure for the purpose of discriminating against minority
voters, nor was there other evidence relevant to the context of adoption
from which discrimination could be inferred.101 And finally, both systems
could have been justified on the basis of the “good government” principle
that it is better to have a representative body comprised of individuals
responsible to the entire geographic polity rather than subsections of the
polity.102
Looking to the context surrounding the operation of the at-large scheme
challenged in Rogers, there were also significant similarities.103 Blacks in
both counties could register and vote without any formal barriers.104
However, even though blacks comprised a significant proportion of the
population in both counties, they constituted a smaller minority of the
registered voting population due to past discrimination against black
participation in the political process.105 Their minority status, combined
100. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615 (explaining that the county had maintained an at-large
voting structure since the creation of the Burke County Board of Commissioners in 1911);
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1067–68 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (describing some of
the minor modifications to the commission form of government and its at-large structure
after 1911).
101. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 397 (acknowledging that the 1911 legislation was acting in a
race-proof situation because of the disenfranchisement of blacks ten years earlier); see also
Rogers, 458 U.S. at 619–22 (failing to identify any testimonial or circumstantial evidence
from the adoption of the scheme that would prove the scheme’s unconstitutionality under the
perpetrator intent standard).
102. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court described the good government principles that
justified multi-member districts. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.15 (1966).
There was also a suggestion in one of the Supreme Court briefs for Bolden that the lower
courts explicitly relied on a particular good government justification to uphold the law. See
Brief for the Appellant at 27, Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (No. 77-1844), 1978 WL 223226, at *27
(“Both [c]ourts below found that the City’s existing form of government, together with its atlarge electoral system necessarily attendant thereto, are facially neutral and were adopted for
racially neutral, good-government purposes at a time when invidious racial motivations
could have played no part . . . .”).
103. In fact, if anything, the context surrounding the operation of the at-large system
challenged in Rogers provided weaker evidence of discrimination than the context
surrounding the operation of the at-large system in Bolden. For example, in Bolden, the
district court found direct evidence of intent behind the maintenance of the at-large plan that
the Supreme Court did not find in Rogers. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 397 (“The evidence is
clear that whenever a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a county delegation
member, a major concern has centered around how many, if any, blacks would be elected.”).
There was also more evidence that voting was polarized along racial lines in Mobile County
than there was for Burke County. See id. at 386–94.
104. Id. at 387; see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624 (noting that black voter registration had
increased since the Voting Rights Act, and suggesting that those who were registered voted
without hindrance).
105. In Burke County, blacks comprised 53.6 percent of the county, but only 38 percent
of the registered voting population. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 614–15. In Mobile County, blacks
comprised 35.4 percent of the population, but only about 28 percent of the registered voters
in the county. See Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 386. The district court in Bolden did not directly
mention the percentage of the voting age population of each race actually registered to vote.
I therefore calculated this number on the basis of the information given in the opinion, which
included total population, percent resident black, percent white registered to vote, and
percent black registered to vote. I used the following equations to reach the percentage of
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with racially polarized bloc voting by whites, precluded them from ever
As a consequence, the county
electing a black representative.106
commissions in the two counties were generally unresponsive to the needs
and interests of the black community.107 This unresponsiveness correlated
with a generally depressed socioeconomic status of blacks in the two
counties.108
Despite the overwhelming similarities between the context of adoption
and operation of the two at-large structures in Bolden and Rogers, the Court
came to a different decision in Rogers.109 Justice Blackmun, who was
presumably unconcerned by the remedy that the lower court imposed in
Rogers, joined the three dissenters from Bolden, along with the newly
appointed Justice O’Connor, and Justice Burger, a member of the Bolden
plurality, in the decision to form a majority that invalidated the at-large
scheme. The majority explained that the evidence surrounding the
operation of the at-large scheme was sufficient to support the district court’s
finding that the “system . . . is being maintained for discriminatory
purposes.”110 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court explain who the
perpetrator of discrimination was; nor did it identify who maintained the atlarge system for discriminatory purposes. Both Justices Powell and
Stevens, writing separate dissents, focused on this inconsistency between
the intent standard employed by the majority in Rogers, which failed to
identify such a perpetrator, and that employed in the trilogy, which did and
seemed to require that future courts do so as well.111
Assessed against the central features of the antidiscrimination principle,
the vote dilution cases, and particularly Rogers, fit rather awkwardly. First,
under the equal protection standard applied in Rogers, the lack of an active
perpetrator of discrimination was ultimately irrelevant to the Court’s
registered voters that were black: Total population * percentage of white residents *
percentage of white registered voters = number of white registered voters; Total population *
percentage of black residents * percentage of black registered voters = number of black
registered voters; Percentage of black registered voters in county = number of black
registered voters/(number of white registered voters + number of black registered voters).
106. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623–24; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 387–89.
107. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 400.
108. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 389–93.
109. In the absence of an aggressive judicial remedy imposed by the district court, Justice
Blackmun joined the Bolden dissenters in the invalidation of the electoral structure. Quite
unexpectedly, Chief Justice Burger switched from the plurality upholding the at-large
structure in Bolden to the majority invalidating the at-large structure in Rogers despite the
similarities in the context of the operation of the two systems. See City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980); see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 614.
110. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623.
111. See id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is incongruous that subjective intent is
identified as the constitutional standard and yet the persons who allegedly harbored an
improper intent are never identified or mentioned.”); id. at 628–29 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting the plurality’s seeming approval of a perpetrator intent standard in Bolden). The
Court inexplicably failed to provide the state with an opportunity to defend the
constitutionality of the at-large scheme by showing that it was designed to achieve a
compelling interest and that it was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. It never
evaluated whether the good government interests for the law were compelling or whether the
at-large scheme was necessary to satisfy this interest.
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assessment of the constitutional validity of the at-large scheme.112 Instead,
what mattered was how the scheme operated in light of the context
surrounding it.113 Second, the standard’s focus on the operation of the atlarge scheme necessitated some baseline for measuring its constitutionality.
For the Court to find that an electoral scheme operates unconstitutionally, it
must rely on some comparator of a properly operating electoral scheme—
one that accords with a particular constitutional principle. The Court never
clearly disclosed what this baseline was in Bolden or Rogers. But it seems
clear that it was not reviving the substantive equality baseline that it
specifically rejected in the Davis trilogy since the Court never mentioned a
lack of proportionate representation for blacks as a relevant consideration.
In Part II, I argue that a principle of representative equality, premised in
part on the opportunity for effective representation of politically
marginalized minority groups, is the best candidate for the substantive
baseline that guided the judicial determination of the constitutionality of the
at-large schemes in the vote dilution cases. But before I probe the contours
of the representative equality principle, in the next section I examine
scholarly attempts to reconcile the standard employed in the vote dilution
cases with the standard employed in the Davis trilogy.
C. Previous Attempts to Explain the Exception
Most scholars of the equal protection discriminatory intent standard
assume that it applies universally, and that it invalidates laws adopted with
a discriminatory motivation.114 These scholars therefore identify the
ambiguous equal protection standard employed in Bolden and the standard
applied in the trilogy as one and the same.115 Rogers, on the other hand, is
even more clearly at odds with the traditional intent standard, and so it is
often relegated to an aside, a footnote, or is altogether ignored. In these
asides and footnotes, scholars concede that there is something unusual
about the intent standard relied on in Rogers to invalidate the at-large
scheme, but they offer little in the way of explanation for the standard or for
how it can be reconciled with the Davis trilogy.116 Instead, they mostly
treat Rogers as an outlier.117

112. Id. at 627 (majority opinion) (invalidating the voting scheme merely because it was
passively “be[ing] maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal access to the political
processes in the county”).
113. Id. at 624–627 (finding intentional maintenance of the scheme on the basis of
evidence from the discriminatory operation of the scheme).
114. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 35–42; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1077, 1095 n.81 (1989) (describing Bolden as a “decision cabining dilution claims to
direct proof of intentional discrimination”).
116. For examples of scholars engaging in a cursory discussion of Rogers, see supra
notes 18–19.
117. See supra notes 18–19. This treatment of Rogers as an outlier fails to account for
the cases that preceded Bolden and Rogers, which established and employed a standard that
looked to the operation of the electoral scheme. See infra Part II.A.

198

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

This outlier status is bolstered by a standard descriptive account for why
the Court reversed course in Rogers. For some scholars, the majority of the
Court in Rogers was simply reacting to institutional pressures from
Congress.118 Almost immediately after the decision in Bolden, Congress
initiated the process of amending a section of the Voting Rights Act to
overturn the plurality opinion in Bolden by providing a statutory means of
redress for vote dilution schemes that had discriminatory operative
effects.119 According to this account, Rogers therefore represented a
temporary pullback from Bolden, and thus its equal protection standard
should not be taken seriously as a reflection of current doctrine.
Descriptive accounts of the Court’s actual purposes are hazardous
because it is difficult to get inside the heads of the justices to understand
what is really motivating their choices. But there is some evidence to
suggest that the Rogers Court was not simply responding to institutional
pressures. First, seven of the nine Justices voted consistently across both
Bolden and Rogers.120 Four of the Justices in the majority in Rogers had
already acquiesced to the standard that focused on operative effects in their
opinions in Bolden,121 and two of the four Justices in the plurality in Bolden
dissented in Rogers,122 as did Justice Stevens who had concurred with the
plurality in Bolden but disagreed with the evidentiary standard employed.
For Justice Stevens, the concern that Rogers seemed to be inconsistent with
the plurality decision in Bolden trumped any perceived institutional
pressure to overturn Bolden. As for the other two justices that joined the
majority in Rogers, Justice O’Connor was a new member of the Court
whose subsequent jurisprudence was not entirely out of line with the
heavily contextualized approach of the majority opinion in Rogers.123 That
leaves Chief Justice Burger, for whom institutional pressure may have been
a factor, as he joined the plurality in Bolden, but then reversed course and
joined the majority in Rogers. But even for Chief Justice Burger, there is
evidence to suggest that he agreed with a standard that looked to operative
effects in the vote dilution context and simply viewed Bolden as
consistently applying such a standard. Evidence to support this conclusion
is the fact that he joined the majority in a key case decided prior to Davis
118. See e.g., Haney López, supra note 19 at 76.
119. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1982 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
120. Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall.
121. Justices Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
122. Justices Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
123. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (authoring the opinion upholding
affirmative action in education on the basis of a diversity rationale that looked to several
current contextual factors of the benefits of diversity); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (authoring the opinion invalidating affirmative action in contracting in
part on the basis of contextual factors surrounding the racial makeup of the legislature and
the population of the city).
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that overturned a voting scheme on the basis of such an operative effects
test.124
Second, it is not even clear why members of the Court would have felt
any institutional pressure in Rogers. Separate constitutional and statutory
standards had coexisted in the public employment context after Davis, in
which the Court determined that the equal protection standard differed from
the Title VII standard.125 This coexistence was facilitated at the time by a
broad understanding of congressional enforcement power under both the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 which
gave Congress room to redress discriminatory conduct through statutes that
would potentially be found valid under the Constitution.127 Given this
space for broader congressional enforcement, it is not clear why the Court
would have felt pressure to change its constitutional standard to respond to
congressional disagreement since neither the standard nor the decision
threatened legislative prerogative.
Finally, the account of Rogers as a decision animated by institutional
pressures becomes much less persuasive when accounting for its connection
to doctrine preceding Davis. Rogers was not the one-off decision of a
nervous Court. Instead, it is a decision that, through its employment of the
operative effects standard, was very consistent with a line of constitutional
vote dilution cases that the Court had previously decided. In the next Part, I
focus on connecting Rogers to this line of cases.
In contrast to those who explain away Rogers, two other scholars have
provided more comprehensive theories to try to account for the unique
standard employed in that case. These scholars’ theories are good starting
points for making sense of the standard employed in the vote dilution cases,
but they are ultimately incomplete.
Daniel Ortiz was the first to offer an explanation for the different equal
protection standards.128 He argued that the intent standard, insofar as it is
said to invalidate laws only on the basis of the motivation of the state actor,
is a myth.129 Instead, the intent standard functions as a mechanism that
124. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). White v. Regester is discussed in detail
below. See infra Part III.C.
125. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
127. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649–50 (1966) (broadly defining
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
upholding a provision of the Voting Rights Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 253–61 (1964) (broadly defining congressional Commerce Clause
authority in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act as applied to public accommodations);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–05 (1964) (broadly defining congressional
Commerce Clause authority in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act as applied to
restaurants). The Supreme Court would not start to narrow these two bases of congressional
authority until the mid-1990s. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20
(1997) (narrowing congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995) (narrowing
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
128. See Ortiz, supra note 20.
129. Id. at 1106 (“Despite the doctrine’s name, ‘intent’ often has little to do with purpose
or motivation.”).
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allocates the burden of proof “differently in different contexts in order to
‘balance’ individual and societal interests consistently with the ideology of
traditional liberalism.”130 This ideology directs that decision making
involving the allocation of market goods like housing and employment
should be left to the market.131 To the extent that the state is involved in
the allocation of these goods, the judiciary should be more deferential to
legislative decisions in allocating them.132 Where the allocation decision
involves nonmarket goods like voting, jury selection, and education, liberal
ideology does not establish a barrier to judicial intervention in decisions
that affect the distribution of these goods.133
With respect to the nonmarket good of voting, Ortiz argued that the
nature of this good has resulted in greater judicial lenience in the
application of the intent standard and, specifically, the evidence needed to
prove discriminatory intent.134
Discussing Bolden and Rogers, he
explained that in these cases, the Court “does not demand any showing of
actual discriminatory motivation in the decision to adopt or retain the atlarge system.”135 Instead, “intent [is] largely coextensive with adverse
impact.”136
Nine years after Ortiz’s seminal piece, Sheila Foster offered an
alternative account of the disaggregated intent standard.137 According to
Foster, the level of judicial restraint employed and the intent standard
applied depend on three factors: “(1) the actor making the decision . . . , (2)
the type of decision made . . . , and (3) the substantive right affected by the
decision.”138 For Foster, the key variable that differentiates the vote
dilution cases from other equal protection cases is the nature of the
substantive right affected by the decision.139 She argued that in cases
involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the Court exercises
the least judicial restraint and subjects laws to invalidation that are shown to
discriminate through objective, circumstantial evidence of intent or
evidence of disparate impact.140
Ortiz’s initial contribution and Foster’s subsequent reformulation are
extremely important in their recognition that the intent doctrine applies
differently in different contexts. Insofar as one can describe it as such, the
intent doctrine that the Court applied in the vote dilution cases of Bolden
and Rogers is clearly different from that which it applied in the trilogy,
which involved issues of housing and employment. However, both Ortiz
130. Id. at 1107.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1127–31.
135. Id. at 1128.
136. Id. at 1129.
137. See Foster, supra note 20, at 1097–1100 (describing Ortiz’s theory and then
introducing her own).
138. Id. at 1121.
139. Id. at 1118–21.
140. Id. at 1122.
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and Foster’s accounts are incomplete descriptions of the relationship
between the intent doctrine and the standard employed in the vote dilution
cases.
First, both authors oversimplify the difference between the evidentiary
burden imposed in the vote dilution cases and that imposed in the trilogy. It
is not merely a matter of the Court applying a more lenient standard in the
vote dilution cases than it did in the trilogy. What is particularly distinct is
that according to the trilogy, the challenger’s burden is to prove the actual
motivations of a state actor that adopts a law.141 But in the vote dilution
cases, the burden is to show that the law operates in a political and social
context that leads it to produce discriminatory consequences.142 Neither
Ortiz nor Foster explain why a plaintiff must prove the motivations of an
actual perpetrator of discrimination in one set of cases and only the
operation of the law in its present setting in the vote dilution cases.
Second, neither author is able to explain why some voting cases decided
after the vote dilution cases continue to use an intent standard. For
example, in cases involving challenges to the alleged race-conscious
drawing of electoral district lines, the Court has again focused on the actual
motivation of state actors rather than the operation of the law.143 Neither
Ortiz nor Foster provides any basis for distinguishing one subset of voting
cases from another.
Third, while Ortiz recognizes that in the vote dilution cases the Court is
in fact judging substantive outcomes rather than correcting procedural
defects,144 he never defines the particular baseline against which the Court
judges these outcomes. Failure to identify the Court’s baseline leaves
Ortiz’s descriptive theory of the equal protection standard incomplete, or at
the very least unsatisfying. A standard that looks to substantive outcomes
unmoored from a defined end is essentially arbitrary.
Both Ortiz and Foster provide an initial foundation for understanding the
disaggregated intent standard by noting that the importance of voting and
electoral structures plays a role in altering the intent standard applied by the
Court. However, important gaps remain in the explanation of the
distinction between the standard the Court employed in the vote dilution
cases and the one it employed in the trilogy. In the next two Parts, I fill
those gaps, first through an interpretation of doctrine, and second through a
more normative justification of the doctrinal account.

141. See supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 95–111 and accompanying text.
143. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (establishing the plaintiff’s burden
as a showing that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to
place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district”); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to “redistricting legislation that is so
bizarre on its face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’”).
144. Ortiz, supra note 20, at 1129 (arguing that in the vote dilution cases, the effect of the
Court’s rationale “is to make intent largely coextensive with adverse impact in voting
cases”).
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II. THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE
Election law scholars have thus far treated the reapportionment cases that
established the requirement of one-person, one-vote as unrelated to the
operative effects standard employed in the vote dilution cases. In this Part,
I argue that the distinctive standard employed in Bolden and Rogers did not
arise in a vacuum. Instead, the best way to make sense of the operative
effects standard is by recognizing its relationship—from both the
perspective of doctrine and democratic theory—to the standard employed in
the one-person, one-vote cases.
Much has been written about the cases that made up the so-called
reapportionment revolution145—a set of cases beginning with Baker v.
Carr146 in 1960 and culminating in 1964 with the decision in Reynolds v.
Sims147 that adopted one-person, one-vote as the standard for evaluating
apportionments under the Equal Protection Clause.148 In this Part, I focus
on identifying the contours of a representative equality principle in these
cases. Specifically, I argue that the Court, through the reapportionment
revolution, is best understood as having established a representative
equality principle that encompassed not only the familiar democratic
principle of individual political equality and majority rule, but also the
principle of effective representation of minorities. This latter aspect took
shape in the decisions that followed directly after the reapportionment
cases. It is against this baseline that districting practices alleged to dilute
the vote are measured.
The judicial development of this substantive constitutional principle
cannot be divorced from the concurrently shifting landscape of democratic
theory. The previously dominant Madisonian theory of democracy had
been principally concerned with constraining majority factions from
tyrannizing minorities and had therefore been used to justify minority
vetoes of majority decisions.149 The disproportionate political strength of
rural voters in malapportioned legislative districts was one version of such a
minority veto. But the pluralist theory that emerged and became dominant
145. See, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF
INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(2008); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002); ROBERT G.
DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS
(1968); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote—One Vote,
One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and
Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277; Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1697 (1999); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of
Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases:
Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000); Phil
C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252.
146. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
147. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
148. The other cases are Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
149. See infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
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during the middle part of the twentieth century rejected majority factions as
mythical in a democracy comprising so many diverse interest groups.150
Instead, pluralist theory equated majority rule with “minorities rule,”
describing a system in which a majority governing at any particular time
simply comprised a coalition of minority groups. These majority coalitions
constantly shifted to encompass new and different groups as a result of
bargaining between minority groups and changes to the political context.
The principal concern within the pluralist model was therefore not
majority tyranny, but rather breakdowns in the pluralist marketplace in
which dominant coalitions of minorities tyrannized other, less powerful
minorities by permanently frustrating their will, principally through ingroups’ exclusion of out-groups from the political bargaining process. It
was this shift from Madisonianism to pluralism that I argue animated the
Court’s rejection of a minority veto in the reapportionment cases.
However, while the Court was acquiescing in a representative equality
principle of majority rule, it was simultaneously articulating a coordinate
principle of effective representation, which ensured marginalized minorities
access to the political process. What follows is an interpretive account of
the reapportionment revolution, beginning with some background to the
revolution.
Before engaging this discussion, a quick note on the methodology
employed in this Part. My goal is to develop a principled explanation that
lends coherence to the doctrine as an ideal jurist would do in approaching
these precedents. In Part III, I go on to argue that this explanation is not
only principled and coherent but rests on strong normative justifications
regarding the Court’s role in a democracy.
A. Background
In the United States, political representation in the federal House of
Representatives and state legislatures is secured through districting—the
process of creating geographic entities comprised of residents responsible
for electing a collective representative. The Constitution in Article I,
Section 4 gives states the authority to apportion legislative districts.151
However, nothing in the Constitution establishes any explicit standard for
how states are supposed to apportion their districts.152 Historically, states
have primarily employed one of two types of districting schemes: singlemember districts in which residents of each district elect one representative
to the legislative body and multi-member, or at-large, districts in which all
the residents of each district jointly elect multiple representatives to the

150. See infra notes 209–16 and accompanying text.
151. Article I, Section 4 states: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
152. See CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED:
CONGRESSIONAL
REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S, at 22 (1990).
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legislative body.153 In most of the early states, districts apportioned for at
least one house of the state legislature were comprised of individual towns
or counties, which ensured the representation of political subdivisions in the
state and federal legislature.154
Most states also mandated in their founding constitutions that at least one
house of the state legislature be composed of representatives elected from
equally apportioned districts.155 Although counting mechanisms and
apportionment baselines were often disputed, states drawing on ideas of
popular sovereignty sought to maintain for at least one house the equal
representation of the people.156 But this was rarely achieved in practice.157
Urbanization from the mid-nineteenth century forward resulted in dramatic
declines in population in rural districts.158 Rather than reapportion districts
to account for the changing demographic landscape, rural legislators,
unwilling to relinquish political power to the burgeoning cities, used their
majorities in state legislatures to obstruct any change to district lines.159 By
the middle of the twentieth century, decades of legislative inaction had left
many state and federal legislative districts grossly malapportioned and rural
153. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 44–46 (describing the origins of
the two forms of districting during the post-colonial era that would serve as the blueprint for
future approaches to districting). The choice between single-member and at-large districts is
ultimately a choice between competing values. Single-member districts are seen as a means
to ensure that voices of various minority factions are heard in the political process. See Neal,
supra note 145, at 277. At-large districts are defended on the basis that they ensure that
elected officials will be responsive to the needs of the entire jurisdiction rather than smaller
fractional interests. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:
The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 538 (1997).
154. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 43 (describing the origin of the
American idea of representing towns in the practices of England that were carried over to the
colonies, which were considered compacts between towns); DIXON, supra note 145, at 60–61
(identifying the state constitutions that mandated representation for political subdivisions in
at least one house of the state legislature); Auerbach, supra note 145, at 11–12 (describing
some justifications for the representation of political subdivisions in legislative bodies).
155. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 38 (“The original constitutions of
forty-one of the fifty states required that in at least one chamber the districts have equal
populations, and twenty-three states required equality in both chambers of their legislatures
in their founding documents.”).
156. See id. at 45 (describing the evolution of the idea of apportionment by population);
DIXON, supra note 145, at 59 (describing the lack of settled meaning of “population” and
disagreements about whether to use gross population or qualified voters as the
apportionment base); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 120–22 (1989) (describing the reform movement for equal
representation at the time of the Founding).
157. DIXON, supra note 145, at 58 (“[W]ith a few exceptions, anything approaching
substantial equality of legislative district population in both houses of state legislatures was
never the general practice in America until [the mid-1960s].”). States that mandated equal
apportionment in their constitutions often qualified it with a requirement that each political
subdivision be represented in the state legislature. This was justified on the basis that each
political subdivision should be guaranteed a “right to be heard.” Id. at 71–77. Most states
had constitutional provisions that apportioned on the basis of factors other than population.
Id. at 81–82.
158. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 11 (“By 1920, just over half of all
Americans lived in urban areas, and by 1960, seven in ten Americans lived in urban and
suburban communities.”); see also DIXON, supra note 145, at 89.
159. ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 40; DIXON, supra note 145, at 82.
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regions entirely overrepresented.160 The result of this arrangement was
minority rule in many states.161
State legislators representing rural districts justified malapportioned
districts on the basis of the Madisonian democratic ideal of avoiding the
tyranny of the majority. In particular, rural state legislators defended these
districts as a means of protecting rural interest groups from being
overridden by a dominant, monolithic urban majority.162 They analogized
to the constitutional protection given, through the operation of the U.S.
Senate, to lesser-populated states against tyranny of the majority by the
more heavily populated states.163 The even distribution of political power
to the states in this body acted to dilute the votes of individuals in the
higher-population states.164 Malapportioned districts likewise protected
against majority tyranny by providing rural interest groups with a minority
veto against an urban majority with adverse interests.165
The problem with this theoretical justification for malapportioned
districts was that it lacked supporting evidence. Particularly, there was
nothing to indicate that urban interests comprised a monolithic majority
with interests adverse to those of their rural counterparts. In fact, there was
evidence to suggest that urban and rural residents shared overlapping
interests, including shared political party affiliations that would serve as the
principal protection against one group tyrannizing the other.166 The
theoretical arguments from Madisonian theory instead bore all the
resemblances of a post hoc justification to preserve the power of certain
state legislators.
Nonetheless, since malapportioned districts often gave disproportionate
power to the majority of state legislators who represented lesser-populated
districts, these legislators had every incentive to maintain the system. They
did so even in the absence of evidence of a monolithic urban majority
determined to tyrannize rural interest groups. At the same time, the hands
of the judiciary seemed tied. Both the state and federal courts refused to

160. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 26–27 (describing in a table the
degree of malapportionment in each state); Karlan, supra note 145, at 1716.
161. This meant that a minority of the population was able to elect a majority of
representatives in state and federal legislative bodies. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra
note 145, at 32–34 (describing the degree of minority rule in several states in which
“legislators representing one-third of the population, sometimes less, could constitute an
outright majority in the state legislature”).
162. See id. at 15.
163. See id. at 34–35.
164. See id. at 48.
165. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 30 (1956) (“Genetically the
Madisonian ideology has served as a convenient rationalization for every minority that, out
of fear of the possible deprivations of some majority, has demanded a political system
providing it with an opportunity to veto such policies.”); DIXON, supra note 145, at 83–84
(describing Madisonian-type arguments made in defense of malapportionment).
166. See Seth C. McKee, Rural Voters and the Polarization of American Presidential
Elections, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 101, 101–04 (2008) (describing the rise and decline of
urban-rural political cleavages in the United States).
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interfere with what they deemed to be the exclusive prerogative of the state
legislatures to draw district lines.167
Theoretical understandings of democracy, however, were shifting. The
Supreme Court reversed course in 1960, entering what Justice Frankfurter
famously described as the “political thicket” of apportionment.168 In the
process, the Court established a substantive baseline for measuring the
constitutionality of all future districting schemes.
B. The Representative Equality Principle: Majority Rule
Before the Court entered into the political thicket of reapportionment in
Baker, Justice Black, in an earlier case, had planted the seeds for the future
development of a principle of representative equality premised on majority
rule. This principle would serve as the basis for protecting the rights of
members of majority coalitions against a minority veto maintained through
malapportioned districts. Ultimately, it would also serve as the substantive
baseline for measuring the constitutionality of malapportioned districts
under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Colegrove v. Green, a plurality of the Court decided not to reach the
merits of a challenge to the constitutionality of malapportioned federal
congressional districts.169 The plurality explained that controversies
surrounding malapportioned districts were “not meet for judicial
determination” because they involved questions peculiarly political in
nature and involved harms suffered not by private individuals but by the
polity as a whole.170 The political branches of the state government, the

167. The problem was the lack of a clear constitutional vehicle to correct the problem of
malapportionment. The Article IV, Section 4 guarantee of a republican form of government
seemed to be closed off from judicial enforcement since the Court had already held that
challenges under this clause were nonjusticiable and involved questions for Congress to
decide and remedy. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (finding
a controversy surrounding the question of which government was lawfully established under
the Republican Form of Government Clause to be nonjusticiable under the political
questions doctrine). Article I, Section 2, which states that “[t]he House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States,” offered a second potential vehicle since the emphasis on “the People” is evidence
that population should be the basis for allocating political power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see
also DIXON, supra note 145, at 104 (“From decennial reapportionment of seats to the states
on a population basis, it is a short step to argue that congressional districting within states
likewise should be on a straight population basis.”). However, the provision is limited in its
reach to federal legislative districts, which would leave state malapportioned districts
untouched. Finally, the Equal Protection Clause provided a potential means for redressing
malapportioned districts, particularly those in place in states; however, the clause had up to
that point been consistently interpreted to protect only individual rights. See, e.g., Breedlove
v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937) (“The equal protection clause does not require absolute
equality.”). Instead, it has only served as a prohibition on arbitrary and unreasonable state
actions. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 369 (1927) (explaining that the state
has broad powers to classify individuals, and classifications will only violate the equal
protection clause if done without “any reasonable basis and therefore [are] purely arbitrary”).
168. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
169. Id. at 552.
170. Id.
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plurality concluded, should resolve these controversies about the proper
allocation of political power.171
For Justice Black, writing in dissent, the question of the constitutionality
of malapportioned districts was justiciable because it implicated individual
rights.172 This conclusion, however, was ultimately premised on an
assumption about the proper structure of representative government.
Justice Black explained that “the constitutionally guaranteed right to vote
and the right to have one’s vote counted clearly imply that state election
systems, no matter what their form, should be designed to give
approximately equal weight to each vote cast.”173
Implicit within Justice Balck’s idea that a system should be designed to
give approximately equal weight to each vote cast was a suggestion about
the form of election system that states should maintain. Some of the
particularities of that form were revealed later in Justice Black’s Colegrove
dissent, where he argued that the mandate of equal apportionment of
districts between the states under Article I, Section 2 was directed at
making “illegal a nation-wide ‘rotten borough’ system.”174 This was a
reference to the oft-maligned “rotten borough” system of England in which
some members of Parliament represented boroughs with very few residents,
a system that led to the devaluation of the vote of residents for members of
Parliament who represented high population boroughs.175 The purpose of
Article I, Section 2 was therefore to establish a system of representation in
the House that would prohibit inequities in the effectiveness of an
individual’s vote. Under this provision, “[a]ll groups, classes, and
individuals shall to the extent that it is practically feasible be given equal
representation in the House of Representatives, which, in conjunction with
the Senate, writes the laws affecting the life, liberty, and property of all the
people.”176
Justice Black’s dissent thus reflected an understanding that the
Constitution not only protects the individual right to vote, but also the right
to an effective vote, which is to be measured in accordance with a structure
of government considered appropriately representative. That structure of
government is one that provides the people with equal representation.
While this account seems uncontroversial now, this was not the only or
even dominant basis of representation then. For alternatives, one could
look to the system of representation by geography in the federal Senate and
171. See id. at 554 (citing Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which gives Congress
the authority to “alter” state regulations on “[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding
Elections” for the state legislature and the federal House of Representatives).
172. See id. at 568 (Black, J., dissenting) (“It is my judgment that . . . the complaint
presented a justiciable case and controversy . . . since the facts alleged show that they have
been injured as individuals.”).
173. Id. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 51 (1986) (describing the infamous British “rotten
borough” system).
174. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 570.
175. REID, supra note 156, at 119–20 (describing the borough system of representation in
England, which involved the representation of geographic space and not people).
176. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 570–71.
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in many state houses, which were designed to ensure that the voices of
political sub-entities would be heard.177 Such apportionments were often
justified as a means for securing interest-based representation for distinct
groups.178
Notably, if the constitutionality of a districting scheme depends on
whether it provides an effective vote measured according to the proper form
of representative government, it follows that the legislative motivation
behind the challenged scheme should be irrelevant to the constitutional
inquiry. This fits with Justice Black’s conclusion that “[w]hether
[malapportionment] was due to negligence or was a wilful effort to deprive
some citizens of an effective vote, the admitted result is that the
constitutional policy of equality of representation has been defeated.”179 In
other words, it did not matter whether state legislators intended to draw
malapportioned districts to deprive individuals of an effective vote or not.
What mattered was that malapportioned districts operated in a manner that
deprived individuals of an equally effective vote.
It would take fifteen years for the Court to finally move in the direction
of Justice Black’s dissent, and when it did, it initially did so only in a
halfway and unsustainable manner.
In Baker, voters challenged
malapportioned state legislative districts in Tennessee under the Equal
Protection Clause.180 The Court rejected the Colegrove plurality’s nonjusticiability finding and held that such claims were in fact justiciable.181
To reach this conclusion, the Court distinguished equal protection
challenges to malapportioned districts from those claims that could be made
under the clause guaranteeing a republican form of government, which the
Court continued to consider nonjusticiable. In the process of distinguishing
the two types of claims, the Court tried to frame the equal protection claim
in exclusively rights-based terms in order to contrast it with the structural
concerns that underlay the Guarantee Clause.
The majority explained that claims under the Guarantee Clause182 were
non-justiciable because of the lack of a manageable judicial standard for
assessing when a government is republican in form.183 In contrast,
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause [were] well
developed and familiar.”184 Those standards focus on the process of
177. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 47.
178. See DIXON, supra note 145, at 83–84 (quoting statements by state elected officials
defending malapportionment as a means to protect rural interest groups).
179. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572.
180. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Neal, supra note 145, at 254 (describing the
degree of malapportionment in Tennessee when the case reached the Supreme Court). As
discussed above, questions about the validity of malapportioned state districts fell outside of
the purview of Article I, Section 2, which was solely concerned with federal legislative
districts.
181. One reason for the reversal of course is that only four Justices remained from the
decision in Colegrove and two of them, Justices Black and Douglas, had dissented in
Colegrove. See Neal, supra note 145, at 257.
182. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
183. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–10.
184. Id. at 226. But see McConnell, supra note 145, at 106 (criticizing this assertion).
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decision making, invalidating laws that discriminate against individuals if
the “discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action.”185 As Justice Clark elaborated in his concurrence, this would
subject to invalidation only those malapportionments that were so “topsyturvical” that they lacked any rational design.186
The Baker standard, which focused on the process of designing the
districts, proved unsustainable because it was divorced from any
articulation of the right in question. The malapportionment of state
legislative districts did not discriminatorily or otherwise deprive anyone of
their right to vote. Nor did it deprive individuals of the opportunity to have
their votes counted. The process-based inquiry left undefined what the state
was arbitrarily and capriciously doing that was unconstitutional through its
malapportionment of districts. Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent,
identified this weakness in the majority’s attempt to frame the equal
protection claim in rights-based terms without identifying the particular
right that was being discriminatorily denied. He asserted that the challenge
to the malapportioned districts was simply a democratic structure-based
“Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label.”187 The
litigants’ complaint against the state system of malapportionment was
simply that “the basis of representation . . . hurts them” by allowing a
minority to rule.188 Such a claim, Justice Frankfurter maintained, is
nonjusticiable under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Guarantee
Clause because it involves the federal court in a political debate that it is not
competent to engage.189
The Court was incompetent because the challengers’ attempt to frame the
issue as a personal one about the debasement or dilution of their vote
requires a political assessment about the proper form of representation for
which the Court lacks comparative insight. To assess whether a vote has
been diluted such that an individual is not able to effectively influence the
political process requires a determination of the level of influence that the
Constitution assures any individual. As Justice Frankfurter explained,
“[S]ince ‘equal protection of the laws’ can only mean an equality of persons
standing in the same relation to whatever governmental action is
challenged, the determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a
This
determination concerning the nature of the relationship.”190
determination, “with respect to apportionment, means an inquiry into the
theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state.”191 In
185. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226 (emphasis omitted).
186. Id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 298.
189. Id.; see also Guy Uriel Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1109
(2002) (arguing that in Baker, Justice Frankfurter was centrally concerned about preserving
the legitimacy of the Court, which he felt would be undermined by “judicial supervision of
democratic politics”).
190. Baker, 369 U.S. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
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other words, in addressing the dilutive effects of an apportionment, the
equal protection of the individual cannot be divorced from a finding about
the proper form of representative government.
Two years after Baker, the Court returned to the question of the
constitutionality of malapportioned federal congressional districts in
Georgia. For the first time, the Court in Wesberry v. Sanders192 held these
districts unconstitutional, and it did so under Article I, Section 2.193 In
rationalizing this invalidation, the Court placed much greater emphasis than
the majority in Baker on the deficiencies of such districts from the
perspective of representative government rather than individual rights. In
doing so, it took a step avoided in Baker toward defining the proper form of
representative government against which malapportioned districts would be
judged.
The Court interpreted the requirement under Article I, Section 2 that
representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States” to mean that
“as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another’s.”194 This interpretation, the Court explained,
was derived from the intent of the Framers of the Constitution who desired
to establish through this provision a House of Representatives that was
fundamentally democratic.195 To define what it meant for the House to be
democratic, the majority returned to the argument Justice Black introduced
in his dissent in Colegrove.196 It defined the democratic structure that the
Framers sought to create in the House in contrast to the rotten borough
system of Parliament in England that they wanted to avoid.197 In this more
democratically structured House, the people should be able to elect
members of the House and “each voter should have a voice equal to that of
every other in electing members of Congress.”198 In other words, the
Framers sought to create in the House a democratic structure that
guaranteed equal representation for equal numbers of people.199
The Court left two fundamental questions unaddressed, even as it
articulated this ideal ofdemocratic government as securing political
equality. The first question revolved around the principle that underlay the
idea of equal representation. Is the goal simply equality for equality’s sake,
or is there some other democratic principle that underlies this goal? The
second question concerned the problem of malapportioned state legislative
districts that are not subject to the mandate of Article I, Section 2. Did the
Court intend after Wesberry that federal congressional districts would be
constitutionally required under Article I, Section 2 to be equally
apportioned while state legislative districts could remain malapportioned so

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Black’s dissent).
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14–15.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10–11.
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long as the apportionment was not done in an arbitrary and capricious
manner under the Equal Protection Clause?
In Reynolds, a case decided the same year as Wesberry, both sets of
questions were answered through the judicial construction of a
representative equality principle under the Equal Protection Clause. This
principle identified the democratic basis for the goal of equal representation
and applied it to state legislative apportionments. In particular, the Court
explicitly adopted majority rule as a central democratic objective that
mandated the invalidation of even those rationally created malapportioned
districts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court tried to avoid Justice
Frankfurter’s criticism in Baker that, through its imposition of a particular
theory of representative government, the Court was masquerading a
Guarantee Clause claim under the label of equal protection. The Court did
so again by attempting to frame the issue in individual-rights based terms.
But in doing so, it clearly conceded that these individual rights claims
would be addressed differently from others it had previously recognized
under the Equal Protection Clause. The most important difference being
that the determination of whether the right in question was violated would
not be based on whether there was some defect in the process of decision
making, such that it reflected arbitrariness or capriciousness. Instead, it
would be based on a determination of whether the state reapportionment
operated contrary to the representative equality principle of majority rule.
As Justice Black had done in dissent in Colegrove, the majority in
Reynolds defined the individual right at stake in the malapportionment of
districts as derivative of the right to vote. In an oft-quoted passage, the
Court explained,
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the
heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.200

Rather than avoiding the question that the assertion of vote dilution
naturally raises—dilution as compared to what—the Court adopted and
elaborated upon the baseline of representative equality established in
Wesberry. An individual’s vote has been diluted when she has been
deprived of the equal representation that is fundamental to democratic
government.201 It is fundamental because in a democracy premised on
representative government, a majority of the voters must be able to elect a
majority of the legislators “responsible for enacting laws by which all
citizens are to be governed.”202 Marrying the principle of representative
government to the individual right to an undiluted vote, the Court declared
that if a democratic government of laws is to be sustained, “the overriding
objective [of apportionment] must be substantial equality of population
200. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
201. Id. at 567–68.
202. Id. at 565.
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among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately
equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the state.”203 In other words,
the principle of representative equality requires “one person, one vote.”204
The Court’s opinion in Reynolds is best explained as adopting majority
rule as a principal baseline value underlying representative equality.
Evidence in support of that interpretation can be found in the Court’s
explicit subordination of other bases of representation that did not depend
on majority rule.
The Court in Reynolds dismissed a theory of
representative government premised on geography, confidently asserting
that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities.”205
Importantly, the Court also rejected a Madisonian conception of
representative government. As Justice Stewart emphasized in dissent, from
a Madisonian perspective, the prioritization of majority rule undermines
interest-based representation by allowing a monolithic majority to control
outcomes and subordinate “a medley of component voices” that represent
minorities in society.206 The Court’s response to this alternative theory of
representative government was just as dismissive as its rejection of a
geographic basis of representation. Implicitly relying on the rightsprotective provisions of the Constitution, it explained that there are other
constitutional means that provide for the protection of members of minority
groups.207 And these other means according to the Court, make a system
that guarantees minority rule over majorities unnecessary.208
Lying in the background of the Court’s rather blithe response to concerns
about insufficient representation of minority interests was a shift in political
theory away from a fixation on the power of a monolithic majority. The
pluralist theory of democracy associated with political scientists such as
Robert Dahl, Earl Latham, and David Truman, had emerged as one of the

203. Id. at 579.
204. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
205. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
206. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 751 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (a companion case to Reynolds v. Sims). Early democratic theory was centrally
concerned about a monolithic majority tyrannizing the minority. Implicit within the
Madisonian concept of a majority faction that has interests “adverse to the rights of other
citizens” is the view that majorities can be unified and monolithic. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, at 43 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001);
see also JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 144
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., Prometheus Books 1991) (1861) (describing
as a principle danger of representative democracy, the “danger of class legislation on the part
of the numerical majority, these being all composed of the same class”).
207. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
208. Id. at 565–66. The Court’s response makes sense if the concern is that the
monolithic majority group will use its power to tyrannize minorities by depriving them of
their constitutional liberties. Minorities can simply obtain relief for such constitutional
violations in the courts. However, if the concern is that the monolithic majority will use its
control over the political process to not only advance its own interests, but also to ignore the
interests of minorities in the political process, the Court’s response provides little comfort.
The Constitution, for example, will not protect the interests of rural minorities to have
government revenues directed toward their particularized needs.
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dominant accounts of representative government by the time the Court
decided Reynolds.209 And pluralist theory provided a refutation to Justice
Stewart’s logic.
Pluralist theory posits that in a well-functioning political marketplace,
rule by a monolithic majority is a myth.210 Many individuals with diverse
interests comprise the United States. The possibility that a monolithic
majority will emerge from this panoply of interests, the theory holds, is
Rather, majority rule is really
therefore simply unimaginable.211
“minorities rule” in that any majority that governs at any point in time will
be comprised of a coalition of several minority groups with crosscutting and
overlapping interests.212 Importantly, the minority groups comprising the
in-group coalition in power will ordinarily include members with
overlapping and crosscutting allegiances with members of minority groups
out of power.213 These overlapping and crosscutting allegiances between
members of the in-group and out-group serve as the principal protection
against tyranny of the majority over the interests of the minorities. They do
so by ensuring that the majority accounts for and considers the interests of
the minority in its decision making.214
Another protection against majority tyranny, according to pluralist
theory, is the inherent instability of majority coalitions. The on-going
political bargaining between interest groups along with changes in the
political context can lead to shifts in the composition of the coalition that
has the ultimate power to govern.215 Thus, in a properly operating pluralist
209. See generally DAHL, supra note 165, at 30–31; ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1963); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a
Theory, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376 (1952).
210. DAHL, supra note 165, at 133; see also Auerbach, supra note 145, at 52 (“The
‘monolithic’ majority feared by Mr. Justice Stewart does not exist; the majority is but a
coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate, broadly representative fashion to
preserve itself.”).
211. See Auerbach, supra note 145, at 52 (explaining that the multiplicity of interests that
exists in American society “keep[s] any one interest, or combination of interests, from
dominating our society”). Although Madisonian theory has been equated with the dangers of
tyranny by a unified and monolithic majority, it does suggest that the possibility of a
monolithic majority faction is greatly diminished in a large and diverse republic. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 206 (James Madison). In the context of current American
society, Madison would likely agree that the idea of a monolithic majority is a myth.
212. DAHL, supra note 165, at 133; see also Auerbach, supra note 145, at 55–56
(describing the multiple and overlapping loyalties that individuals share with different
groups that “tempers the single-mindedness of each group and makes it amenable to
legislative compromise”).
213. See DIXON, supra note 145, at 51 (Pluralism is premised on the idea of “[t]he
richness and complexity both of individual and group life, and the current tendency of all
individuals to have membership in several minorities at any given time, combine to give us a
system . . . of shifting concurrent minorities”); TRUMAN, supra note 209, at 43 (“Any society
. . . is a mosaic of overlapping groups of various specialized sorts.”); Nicholas R. Miller,
Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 735 (1983) (describing the nature
of cross-cutting cleavages).
214. See Auerbach, supra note 145, at 55.
215. See id. at 52 (describing this political bargaining process as a central feature of
legislative and administrative processes). According to pluralist theory, the legislature
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marketplace, minorities are usually protected against permanent frustration
of their political will. A minority out of power one day can be part of the
majority in power the next through participation in the give and take of a
competitive political marketplace.216 This process of minority interest
bargaining and coalition building provides the additional layer of protection
that renders unnecessary a guarantee of minority rule for the representation
of minority interests.
Applying this theory to the reapportionment cases, residents of rural
districts, or any other ordinary minority, did not need the extra protection of
a minority veto provided by malapportioned districts. Assuming that a
particular minority had the opportunity to engage in the give and take of
politics, their interests would be protected through a process of
accommodation and compromise in the pluralist marketplace.
The Court in Reynolds should thus be understood as having adopted a
substantive constitutional principle of representative government under the
Equal Protection Clause that was premised on equal representation and
majority rule. In the process, it established an equal protection standard
that invalidated malapportioned districts, not because they were adopted
with impure motives, but because they operated in a way that conflicted
with this principle. The triumph of substance over process is evidenced by
the Court’s clear rejection of a process basis, offered by Justice Clark in his
Reynolds concurrence, for invalidating the malapportioned districts. In this
concurrence, Justice Clark suggested that the Court should have simply held
that the apportionment scheme was arbitrary, in that it constituted “a crazy
quilt” that revealed invidious discrimination in its creation.217 Despite the
seeming simplicity of such reasoning and its consistency with the Court’s
past equal protection jurisprudence, no other justice joined Justice Clark’s
concurrence.
C. The Representative Equality Principle: Effective Representation
The general scholarly consensus is that Reynolds marked the culmination
of the reapportionment revolution.218 I argue, however, that in the years
following Reynolds, the reapportionment revolution continued and the
representative equality principle evolved in the face of newer types of equal
protection challenges to districting and apportionment. Political equality
and majority rule remained as the central mandate for the apportionment of

serves as the “referees” of group bargaining and seeks to serve the winning coalition in the
policy-making process. See Latham, supra note 209, at 390. Public policy, therefore
represents the “equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment.” Id.
216. DAHL, supra note 165, at 132 (“Elections and political competition[s] . . . vastly
increase the size, number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into
account by leaders in making policy choices.”).
217. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964) (Clark, J. concurring) (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 253–258 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring)).
218. See supra note 145 (citing various scholars).
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electoral districts.219 But the Court’s response to vote dilution claims in
subsequent cases reveal an additional imperative under the Equal Protection
Clause. This imperative, which focused on providing minorities with
equally effective representation in the political process, is traceable to the
pluralist account that the political marketplace is not always inclusive of all
interests.
Just before the reapportionment revolution, a leading political scientist,
Robert Dahl, published an important book criticizing Madisonian
democratic theory: A Preface to Democratic Theory. In it, Dahl suggested
that rather than fixating on concerns about majority tyranny, “the more
relevant question is the extent to which various minorities in a society will
frustrate the ambitions of one another.”220 In a society where members of
groups hold multiple identities and interests and in which social cleavages
are crosscutting and overlapping, this concern is not particularly
pressing.221 Members of a frustrated minority group can always use their
membership in, and allegiance to, other groups to garner support for their
interests to prevent the submergence of their will. But Dahl was writing in
the context of enduring societal divisions. He likely recognized the reality
that rather than being crosscutting and overlapping, some cleavages were
deep and reinforcing and that these latter cleavages arose from deep-seated
animus and distrust between certain groups.222 Because of these deep and
reinforcing social cleavages, certain groups face great difficulty in creating
political coalitions with members of other groups, even those other groups
with which they share some aspect of identity or interest. This leads to the
political marginalization of certain groups who are left out of the political
bargaining process in the pluralist marketplace.
And unless the
marginalized group comprises a majority in an electoral jurisdiction,223 this

219. This mandate required that at least every ten years, states, counties, and cities that
used single-member districting schemes had to reapportion to equalize the population of
each of their districts. See Karlan, supra note 145, at 1715.
220. DAHL, supra note 165, at 133; see also DIXON, supra note 145, at 37 (describing the
twentieth century shift from Madisonianism and its central concern with protecting a
minority from majority tyranny to “pluralism-in-fact” with its central concern of providing
“means for minority access to government and minority participation in the multifaceted
process of decision-making”).
221. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 97 (1959) (“The evidence
available suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that
social strata, groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant
affiliations.”).
222. Writing in the mid-1950s, Dahl described as “[a] central guiding thread of American
constitutional development . . . the evolution of a political system in which all the active and
legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the
process of decision.” DAHL, supra note 165, at 137. He included African Americans in the
South as one such active and legitimate group. See id. at 138; see also EDWARD ALSWORTH
ROSS, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 164–65 (1920) (describing the dangers of violence in a
society divided along a single, reinforcing cleavage).
223. There are contexts in which a politically marginalized minority might be able to
develop a coalition with another sympathetic minority, which also may happen to be
similarly marginalized.
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can lead to the permanent frustration of the will of that group and the
group’s exclusion from any influence over policymaking.
The judicial doctrine that developed in the years following Reynolds
reflected an awareness of this potential breakdown in the pluralist
marketplace. A central concern was redressing structural impediments to
opportunities for politically marginalized minorities to influence the
political process.224 In this doctrinal development, the focus of judicial
scrutiny was more on the operative effects of the structural impediment
rather than the process of their adoption.
The seeds of this doctrine emerged in response to an equal protection
challenge to the election of state senators in multi-member at-large districts
in Fortson v. Dorsey.225 In Reynolds, the Court had held that at-large
districts in which multiple legislators were elected from one district were
not unconstitutional per se so long as they complied with the one-person,
one-vote requirement.226 The district at issue in Fortson complied with this
mandate. Seven state senators represented a multi-member district that had
approximately seven times the population of other single-member state
senatorial districts in Georgia.227 Nonetheless, the challengers claimed that
the multi-member district submerged the interests of members of minority
groups residing in it.228 They explained that it did so by making it more
difficult for minorities in the larger multi-member districts to build majority
coalitions to influence elections than it was for minorities in the smaller
single-member districts.229 The Court ultimately rejected this claim and a
similar claim brought the next year in Hawaii for lack of evidence that the
interest of the particular group had been submerged.230
Significantly, though, the Court in Fortson left the door open to future
challenges to multi-member districts. The Court explained, “[O]ur opinion
is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances
such a system . . . will comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection
224. Like the one-person, one-vote doctrine, the cases establishing the principle of
effective representation did not fit neatly within the individual rights framework previously
established for the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the Court in these cases responded to
group challenges to electoral structures that did not provide effective representation. See
Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663,
1666 (2001) (“Vote dilution claims implicate a special kind of injury, one that does not fit
easily with a conventional view of individual rights. That is because they require a court to
consider the relative treatment of groups in determining whether an individual has been
harmed.”) (emphasis omitted).
225. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
226. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 578–79 (1964).
227. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 437.
228. See Brief for the Appellees at 9, Fortson, 379 U.S. 433 (No. 178), 1964 WL 81329,
at *9. In a related case decided a year later, challengers to multi-member districts in Hawaii
complained that the co-existence of a multi-member and single-member districting system
resulted in the unequal and therefore unconstitutional submergence of minority voters. See
Reply Brief for John A. Burns, Governor of the State of Hawaii at 17–27, Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (Nos. 318, 323, 409), 1966 WL 115395, at *17–27.
229. See Brief for the Appellees at 8, Fortson, 379 U.S. 433 (No. 178), 1964 WL 81329,
at *8.
230. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 88; Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Clause.”231 It also proffered a standard for evaluating such claims: “It
might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population.”232
Notably, the Fortson standard specifically rejects a pure process-based
approach to addressing claims of interest submergence or vote dilution.
Whether there is a defect in the political process that causes the
apportionment scheme to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political elements is ultimately irrelevant. Instead, the central issue
is whether the scheme “operates” in a way that minimizes or cancels out the
voting strength of particular groups. This suggests, at the very least,
judicial recognition that there is some substantive value relevant to the
evaluation of these claims of vote dilution. As with any standard that
focuses on the operation of a state law, there must be a baseline for
measuring when the state law violates the Constitution—in this context, a
baseline for determining when a state apportionment scheme has
unacceptably minimized or cancelled out the voting strength of a racial or
political element.
Two cases decided in the early 1970s are best understood as developing
the contours of a constitutional baseline of effective representation in the
political process as an addendum to the representative equality principle.
This baseline of effective representation provided a subsequent guide for
the Court’s choice of standards in Bolden and Rogers.
In the first case, Whitcomb v. Chavis,233 poor black residents of the
Center Township Ghetto in Marion County, Indiana, claimed that the multimember districting scheme in place in the county submerged their
interests.234 The challengers did not try to argue that the State of Indiana
intentionally adopted the multi-member districting scheme to minimize or
cancel out their vote. In fact, they conceded that there was no basis for such
a claim since the multi-member districting scheme was adopted at a time
when there were no substantial ethnic or racial enclaves in Marion
County.235
Instead, the challengers relied on the standard developed in Fortson,
which required them to prove that the multi-member constituency
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of the case, would operate
to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements
of the voting population. They therefore based their case on evidence from
the political and social context in which the multi-member scheme
operated, to argue that the scheme deprived them of effective representation

231. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439.
232. Id.
233. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
234. Brief of the Appellees at 5–12, Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124 (No. 92), 1970 WL 136610,
at *5–12.
235. Id. at 28–29.
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in the political process.236 This included evidence that residents of the
Center Township Ghetto shared distinctive interests in such things as
“housing regulations, sanitation, welfare programs, garnishment statutes,
and unemployment compensations, among other others.”237 They presented
evidence showing that state legislators elected in the multi-member district
disproportionately hailed from other parts of the county and proved
unresponsive to the community’s interests.238 Finally, the challengers
offered evidence showing that residents of the Center Township Ghetto
would be able to elect candidates of their choice who would be responsive
to their interests if the state replaced the multi-member district with singlemember districts.239
As it had done in the prior two challenges to multi-member districts,240
the Court rejected the claim of the residents of the Center Township Ghetto
because they had not proven that the multi-member district diluted their
vote.241 As the Court explained, the fact that Center Township Ghetto
residents were not able to elect a proportionate number of state legislators
responsive to their needs and interests did not, in itself, prove a claim of
vote dilution.242 Rather, the residents had to show that the electoral scheme
deprived them of the opportunity “to participate in the political process[]
and to elect legislators of their choice.”243 This, the Court explained, they
had not done.244 Rather than reflecting the lack of opportunity to influence
the political process, the unresponsiveness of Marion County legislators
resulted from the fact that Republicans had won four of the five elections
from 1960 to 1968 while the residents of the Center Township ghetto had
voted overwhelmingly Democratic.245 During this time, the Democratic
Party had shown itself to be inclusive of the residents’ interests. The party
had slated candidates from the Center Township Ghetto in the one election
that the party won, and there was no evidence that they had failed to slate
such candidates in the other elections.246 The Court therefore inferred that
had the Democrats won more than one election, the interests of the Center
Township Ghetto would have been more fully represented.247
While the Court rejected the vote dilution claim in Whitcomb, it
nonetheless reaffirmed the Fortson standard for valid vote dilution claims,
which focused on the operation of the electoral scheme rather than the

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 11.
Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
Id. at 1381–85.
Id. at 1385.
See supra notes 225–32 and accompanying text.
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153–55.
Id. at 149–55.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 152–53.
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process of its adoption.248 A lack of proportionate representation, however,
was determined in Whitcomb to not be the proper constitutional baseline for
assessing whether a scheme cancelled out or minimized the voting strength
of racial or political elements under the Fortson standard. Instead, the
Court in Whitcomb suggested that access to the political process in terms of
the effective opportunity to influence electoral outcomes would be the
appropriate baseline for assessing whether the pluralist marketplace was
functioning properly. It explained:
The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the
outcome of . . . elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative
seats of its own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies
where, as here, there is no indication that . . . the population is being
denied access to the political system.249

Whitcomb left open an important question: what evidence would be
necessary to show that an electoral structure operated to deprive a racial or
political element of access to the political process? The Court answered
this question two years later in White v. Regester,250 when it unanimously
invalidated two multi-member voting districts in Texas because they
provided members of two politically marginalized racial groups with less
opportunity than other residents “to participate in the political process[] and
to elect legislators of their choice.”251
In Dallas County, Texas, African Americans, who comprised nearly 25
percent of the one million residents, registered and voted freely.252 Yet
they had only elected two blacks to the Texas House of Representatives
since Reconstruction in the mid-nineteenth century.253 These two were the
only blacks ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Responsible
Government (DCRG), the chief Democratic candidate slating organization
in Dallas County.254 In contrast to the situation in Marion County, Indiana,
where African Americans excluded by one political party could presumably
join and support the opposing political party, Texas was essentially a one
party state in which the Democratic Party controlled most elected offices.255
The party primary was therefore the only election that really mattered. This
meant that the DCRG exerted a great degree of control over who would be
248. Id. at 143 (“Multi-member district systems . . . may be subject to challenge where
the circumstances of a particular case may ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.’”).
249. Id. at 154–55.
250. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
251. Id. at 766.
252. Brief of Appellees Thelma Washington and George Allen at 9, White, 412 U.S. 755
(No. 72-147), 1973 WL 171747, at *9.
253. White, 412 U.S. at 766.
254. Id. at 766–67.
255. See Brief for Appellees Regester at 30, White, 412 U.S. 755 (No. 72-147), 1973 WL
171745, at *30 (explaining that “[t]he Democratic nomination remains the crucial
determinant” for securing elected office as reflected in the fact that “[o]nly one of the fifteen
Dallas County Legislators was Republican in 1970 and he was able to win only by dint of
substantial expenditures and endorsement in the general election by the DCRG and all major
newspapers”).
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selected for office through its decision about which candidate to slate for
elected office.256 Its refusal to involve blacks in the slating process acted as
a major impediment to black access to the political process in Dallas
County by eliminating the opportunity for them to influence which
candidate would be elected at this pivotal stage of selection.257
In addition, the DCRG refused to slate candidates responsive to African
Americans because it did not need the support of members of the black
community to secure election in the county.258 The DCRG likely
recognized that blacks were politically isolated in a county with a racially
polarized electorate in which most white voters refused to vote for black
candidates or even candidates responsive to black interests. Those few
candidates that did try to appeal to the interests of the black community
suffered electoral costs as the DCRG engaged in racially charged campaign
tactics designed (usually successfully) to appeal to white voters who were
intent on punishing these candidates.259 Given this dynamic, any candidate
that made it through the nomination process could not fairly be seen as
responsive to the black community in Dallas. This lack of responsiveness
combined with other electoral rules to effectively prevent blacks from
“enter[ing] into the political process in a reliable and meaningful
manner.”260
Similarly, Mexican-Americans in Bexar County, Texas, were found to
have little opportunity to influence the political process. This group, which
comprised 29 percent of the county, had suffered deprivation in the areas of
education, employment, economics, housing, and health.261 Their lack of
influence followed from a history of political exclusion in which, as the
district court described, “a cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with the
poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures . . . operated
to effectively deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in
Texas.”262 The Court concluded that in Bexar County, “[s]ingle member
districts were . . . required to remedy ‘the effects of past and present
discrimination against Mexican-Americans,’ and to bring the community
into the full stream of political life of the county and State by encouraging
their further registration, voting, and other political activities.”263
Consistent with the Court’s approach in Whitcomb and the standard first
articulated in Fortson, none of the evidence on which the Court relied in
White to invalidate the multi-member districts in Texas had anything to do
with the process of adoption of the electoral scheme. The Court instead
256. White, 412 U.S. at 766–67.
257. Id. at 767.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 766–67 (describing other electoral rules like a majority vote requirement and a
so-called place requirement).
261. Id. at 768.
262. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 731 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Archer v.
Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973).
263. White, 412 U.S. at 769 (quoting Graves, 343 F. Supp. at 733).
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squarely focused on evidence from the context in which the multi-member
electoral structures operated to support its invalidation of the structures.
Specifically, it measured the operation of the two multi-member schemes
against the constitutional baseline of access to the political process and
found that they both operated in an unconstitutional manner—a manner that
undermined representative equality.
The Fifth Circuit would later
summarize the evidence relevant to prove an equal protection violation
under the standard articulated in White. The circuit court explained that
members of a minority group can prove dilution through “an aggregate of
. . . factors [including] lack of access to the process of slating candidates,
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a
tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general precludes
the effective participation in the election system.”264
What is notable about this list is that none of the evidence listed is
focused on showing that the multi-member districts themselves cause
politically marginalized groups to be deprived of the opportunity to
influence the political process. Rather, the multi-member system is viewed
as a structural impediment to remedying a breakdown in the pluralist
marketplace at the societal level in which structural cleavages—reinforced
by animus, distrust, and indifference—serve as obstacles to political
coalition building between groups. The constitutional objective in these
contexts was to force states to establish single-member districts in their
stead. These districts would provide members of previously excluded racial
groups with an opportunity to influence the electoral process through
political bargaining in smaller districts comprised of residents open to
including those groups in the majority coalition.
With its decision in White, the Court put in place the second part of the
basic doctrinal structure underlying the representative equality principle.
Not only are electoral structures that operate to undermine individual
political equality and majority rule unconstitutional, electoral structures that
operate to deprive minorities of the opportunity for representation in the
political process violate the Equal Protection Clause as well.
There is important evidence that the representative equality principle was
intended as a separate basis for evaluating certain laws under the Equal
Protection Clause providing a distinct standard from the antidiscrimination
principle that the Court reaffirmed in the Davis trilogy. In Davis, the Court
extensively discussed several of its prior equal protection cases involving
education, welfare, racial gerrymandering, and jury selection to support its
argument that a process-based perpetrator intent standard had always been
employed in the equal protection context.265 It also disapprovingly cited
264. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
265. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976) (citing Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school segregation); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)
(welfare); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (jury selection); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (jury selection); Carter v. Jury
Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Whitus v. Georgia,
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several lower court opinions establishing a disparate impact test for
employment discrimination claims.266 Yet the Court never discussed or
cited any of the one-person, one-vote cases or the vote dilution cases that
collectively established the representative equality principle. This omission
of the reapportionment cases should not be considered a simple oversight
for two important reasons: First, the reapportionment cases were
particularly salient at the time that the Court decided Davis, as reflected in
the parallel adjudications in which the Court cited and relied on the
reasoning in those cases. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, Justice White
wrote the majority opinion in both White and Davis. This suggests that the
Court saw the reapportionment cases as addressing a distinct problem that
required the adoption of a distinct standard.
In sum, the best explanation for what the Court did in the
reapportionment revolution was to define the two principal imperatives
underlying the representative equality principle—majority rule and
effective representation for minority groups. These imperatives implicitly
served as the constitutional baseline for the evidentiary standard employed
by the Court in Bolden and Rogers to evaluate the operation of the electoral
scheme. The evidence in Rogers that blacks in Burke County, Georgia, had
never elected an African American to the Board of Commissioners and had
little opportunity to elect a candidate responsive to their interests, combined
with the absence of competition between political parties and the general
unresponsiveness of the Board to the African American community,
indicated that the pluralist marketplace had broken down. In this context,
the structural impediment of at-large districts had to be removed and
replaced by single member districts that would provide blacks with equal
opportunity to influence the political process.
The reapportionment cases provide a basis for understanding the standard
employed in Bolden and Rogers, and particularly the constitutional baseline
that the Court measured the at-large scheme against. In the next Part I
argue that the Court’s enforcement of a baseline of representative equality
is justified as a form of representation-structuring judicial review. I also
385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jury selection); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(cohabitation statute); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (racial gerrymandering);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (jury
selection); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (jury selection); Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (jury selection); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400 (1942) (jury selection); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (jury selection); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (jury selection)). The Court also explained away cases
that seemed to turn on disparate impact, arguing that they were in fact cases that looked to
discriminatory purpose. Id. at 242–43 (citing Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)). The next year, in Arlington
Heights, the Court asserted that a few other cases that seemed to turn on the operative effect
of a law were in fact cases about discriminatory purpose. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (racial gerrymandering); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (vote denial);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (vote denial); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (discriminatory exclusion from a benefit)).
266. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
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argue that this accords with a proper role for an unaccountable and
unelected judiciary in a democracy.
III. THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AND REPRESENTATIONSTRUCTURING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Political process theory is one of the most important theories of judicial
review in a democracy.267 Drawn from the famous footnote four in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.268 and principally developed by John Hart
Ely, process theory identifies a basis for reconciling the unelected and
unaccountable judiciary’s role in the review and invalidation of laws with a
system of democracy in which the laws enacted are responsive and
accountable to the will of the people. According to process theory, the two
principal functions of judicial review in a democracy are clearing the
channels of political change and facilitating the representation of
In performing these roles, courts are engaging in
minorities.269
representation-reinforcing judicial review in which they correct processbased malfunctions in a representative democracy. Part of the allure of
process theory is the idea that it constrains judges to only overturn actions
of the representative branches when such actions are the product of a
democratically defective process; by limiting judges to these procedural
bases for overturning laws, process theory hopes to eliminate or narrow the
discretion of judges to make substantive value choices.270 A number of
scholars have described how the intent standard articulated in the Davis
trilogy, and its focus on the process underlying the adoption of laws, fit
neatly within this theoretic account.271
There is, however, potential for conflict between judicial enforcement of
the representative equality principle on the one hand, which necessarily
rests on a substantive value choice about the proper form of democratic
governance, and the process-based account of the Equal Protection Clause
on the other. I argue in this Part that the two can be reconciled.
Representation-reinforcing judicial review is itself premised on a certain
pluralist conception of representative democracy; even conventional
process theory requires a substantive value choice in that sense. In its
267. See generally ELY, supra note 28. The theory, however, does not lack competitors
and it is often criticized. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 194–99 (1990); Ackerman, supra note 31; Paul Brest,
The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 511–16 (1981); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect
Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991); Laurence
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). But see Michael J. Klarman,
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
268. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
269. See ELY, supra note 28, at 103.
270. See id. at 102–03.
271. Flagg, supra note 18; Lawrence, supra note 18; David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race,
and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). But see Ortiz, supra note 20
(questioning the accepted belief that process theory underlies the intent doctrine).
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enforcement of the representative equality principle, the Supreme Court is
working on the basis of a similar political conception of democracy, with
the difference that in this case its review serves to establish critical
preconditions for representative democracy.
In the two subsections that follow, I discuss the two primary
representation-reinforcing roles that process theorists typically ascribe to
courts. I show that although judicial enforcement of the antidiscrimination
principle in the Davis trilogy and its progeny fits neatly within one of the
two primary roles, judicial enforcement of the representative equality
principle does not fit neatly within either role. Instead, I argue that the
judicial enforcement of the representative equality principle fits and is
justified by an essential third role for the Court, the need for which is
implicit within process theory: representation-structuring judicial review.
A. Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review
The starting point for process theory is the famous footnote four in
Carolene Products. In that footnote, Justice Stone imported into an
ordinary case an extraordinary account of the function of judicial review in
a democracy.272 According to this account, the representative institutions
of government should be responsible for making substantive value choices
that affect society.273 The role of the courts, through judicial review of
laws, is to correct systematic malfunctions in the political marketplace. The
courts should do so by guarding against two principal defects that indicate
that the political process is “undeserving of trust.”274 First, courts should
272. In Carolene Products, the Court applied minimal rational basis scrutiny to evaluate
the constitutionality of the statute. Under this standard, the statute had a strong presumption
of constitutionality. Justice Stone, however, explained in footnote 4:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within the specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subject to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). Paragraphs two and three of
the footnote are central to the process-theoretic account. John Hart Ely, the principal
proponent of process theory interprets paragraph two as designating to the courts the role of
“keep[ing] the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the
channels of political participation and communication are kept open.” ELY, supra note 28, at
76. Ely interprets paragraph three as directing courts to “concern [themselves] with what
majorities do to minorities.” Id.
273. ELY, supra note 28, at 103.
274. Id.

2012]

THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE

225

correct defects that arise from “the ins . . . choking off the channels of
political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out.”275 This is the anti-entrenchment rationale for judicial review.276
Second, courts should guard against defects in contexts in which “no one is
actually denied a voice or a vote, [but] representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of
simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of
interests.”277 This is the antidiscrimination rationale for judicial review.278
The responsibility for protecting against entrenchment and discrimination is
properly given to the Court because elected representatives cannot be
trusted to identify and rectify either of these defects since they are often the
source or beneficiaries of the defects. Judges, on the other hand, are
relative outsiders and experts in process and therefore well situated to
properly evaluate and resolve the defects.279
1. Anti-entrenchment Review
Both Ely and current law of politics scholars view the reapportionment
cases as clear examples of the anti-entrenchment form of representationreinforcing judicial review. Through this anti-entrenchment role, courts are
responsible for invalidating obstacles to the effective functioning of “the
democratic process that the legislature itself creates.”280 Ely describes
restrictions on the vote, including the devaluation of votes through
malapportionment, as the “quintessential stoppage” in the democratic
process that the Court has actively reviewed to prevent the ins from choking
off the channels of political change by deciding who stays out of the
democratic process.281 More recently, law of politics scholars such as
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have fleshed this argument out,
suggesting that the Court invalidated malapportioned districts in response to
an entrenchment problem reflected in the unwillingness of certain
legislators to relinquish power.282 In particular, they argue that the standard
275. Id.
276. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: The Elysian Fields of the
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2004).
277. ELY, supra note 28, at 103.
278. Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 276, at 697.
279. ELY, supra note 28, at 103.
280. Ortiz, supra note 20, at 727.
281. See ELY, supra note 28, at 117. Ely is also concerned with restrictions on freedom
of expression and delegation of lawmaking to indirectly accountable agencies. See id. at
105–16, 131–34.
282. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 595 (2002) (describing the concern animating the reapportionment cases as the endsoriented manipulation of districts); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 44 (2004) (“The justification for judicial
review in contexts such as malapportionment is to address the structural risk of political selfentrenchment.”); see also Klarman, supra note 153, at 513 (describing malapportionment as
an entrenchment problem). These scholars have suggested that the Court’s focus should be
less on protecting the rights of individuals and more on securing “an appropriately
competitive partisan environment.” Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998).
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of one-person, one-vote, which required state legislatures to reapportion on
a periodic basis, was intended to redress the problem of entrenchment.283
However, a closer look at the reapportionment cases, particularly those
establishing one-person, one-vote as the constitutional standard, and the
rationales underlying them, reveals that the Court is not merely engaging in
anti-entrenchment judicial review. It is surely the case that concerns about
entrenchment partially motivated political outsiders to challenge
malapportioned districts.
The impetus for the challenge to the
malapportionment in Tennessee in Baker was the failure of rural state
legislators to agree to reapportion every ten years as required by the state
Constitution. And for one Justice at least, the decision to join the majority
holding in Baker that malapportionment presented a justiciable controversy
was a response to the lack of alternative political channels to force state
legislators to reapportion.284 But the cases that followed Baker indicate that
the Court was doing something more than simply responding to the process
defect of legislative entrenchment. And this suggests that we need to look
elsewhere for a process-theoretic justification for judicial review in these
cases.
First, the anti-entrenchment explanation cannot account for the judicial
invalidation of malapportioned districts that arose from requirements
embedded in state constitutions. Many states sought to replicate the federal
model of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives. They
therefore required in their constitutions that one house of the state
legislature be apportioned on the basis of geography—usually on the basis
of political subdivisions like counties—and the other house on the basis of
population.285 Many of these constitutional systems of apportionment predated the mass migrations to the cities that began in the late nineteenth
century.286 Rural state legislators, therefore, cannot be seen as actively
entrenching their own power in these contexts any more than senators in the
context of the U.S. Senate. Rather, legislators represented political
subdivisions of varying sizes in accordance with a state constitutional
mandate. Nonetheless, despite the absence of an entrenchment problem, the
Court struck down these mini-federal plans in two of the companion cases
to Reynolds.287 It explained that these plans were inconsistent with the
283. See Foster, supra note 20, at 1118–19 (arguing that the vote dilution cases go “to the
proper functioning of the democratic process” and are thus “critical to the functioning of an
open and effective democratic process” (quoting ELY, supra note 28, at 105)).
284. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 156–58 (describing how Justice
Clark switched sides from dissenting to concurring with the majority opinion in Baker after
deciding that people of the state lacked any alternative political channels to correct the
malapportionment).
285. See id. at 46–47 (describing the extent of constitutionally prescribed county
representation in state legislatures).
286. See id.
287. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1964)
(invalidating the apportionment formula of the Maryland state constitution because it did not
apportion on the basis of population); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653–54
(1964) (invalidating the apportionment formula of the New York State Constitution because
it did not apportion on the basis of population).
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federal constitutional mandate that population be the basis of apportionment
for the entire state legislature.288
Second, the Court’s decision in a third companion case to Reynolds,
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,289 is notable because
it is also inconsistent with the idea that the Court was exclusively, or even
predominantly, concerned with the problem of entrenchment. After the
decision in Baker, the people of the State of Colorado agreed by popular
initiative to maintain malapportioned districts in one house of their state
legislature rather than adopt one that would provide approximately equally
apportioned districts in both houses.290 There was majority support for the
districting arrangement in every county of the state, including the urban
ones that lost political power due to the malapportionment.291 While rural
legislators likely supported the initiative, they were clearly not responsible
for entrenching their own power in the state legislature; rather the
responsibility lay with the people as a whole. Nonetheless, the Court
invalidated the popularly ratified malapportioned scheme explaining that,
irrespective of its means of adoption, it was inconsistent with the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.292 If the role of the Court in
these cases was only to clear the channels of political change, the Colorado
system of apportionment should have been upheld given the availability and
utilization of the popular initiative, an alternative political channel to
prevent entrenchment. The fact that the Court did not choose this path is
evidence that it was concerned about something more than entrenchment.
Finally, the judicial solution to the problem of malapportionment in these
cases does little to resolve the problem of legislative entrenchment. The
judicial mandate of one-person, one-vote under the Equal Protection Clause
requires that state legislatures reapportion after the census every ten years to
provide for equally apportioned districts. If the concern with entrenchment
is that state legislators will manipulate apportionments to maintain their
power, then it is precisely the wrong answer to give them freer rein to
configure their districts in a way that will best allow them to retain power
and prevent outsiders from sharing in that power.293 The constitutional

288. See Tawes, 377 U.S. at 674–75; WMCA, 377 U.S. at 653–54.
289. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
290. Id. at 717 (the residents of the State of Colorado adopted the malapportioned scheme
by a vote of 305,700 to 172,725 and defeated the scheme that required equal apportionment
in both houses by a vote of 311,749 to 149,822); see also id. at 731 (holding that “a majority
of the voters [of] every county of the State voted in favor of the . . . scheme” that
apportioned seats on the basis of geography rather than population).
291. See id. at 730.
292. The Court recognized that this case was distinct from other cases it had decided
because “the initiative device provide[d] a practicable political remedy to obtain relief
against alleged legislative malapportionment in Colorado.” Id. at 732. Nonetheless, the
Court held that the apportionment of Senate seats under the initiative “clearly involve[d]
departures from population-based representation too extreme to be constitutionally
permissible.” Id. at 734–35.
293. See Engstrom, supra note 145, at 278 (“Not only had the Court failed to develop
effective checks on the [legislative] practice of gerrymandering, but in pursuing the goal of
population equality to a point of satiety it had actually facilitated that practice.”).
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bounds of equally apportioned districts is not much of a limit at all, given
the many ways that districts can be configured within this constraint.
Moreover, the requirement that legislators reapportion every ten years gives
legislators constitutional cover for the continual revision of districts to
better secure entrenchment in response to population shifts. These
opportunities for entrenchment can be contrasted with the prior arrangement
in many states in which political subdivisions were represented in at least
one house and legislators could not control who their constituents were.
Such an arrangement did skew representation in favor of rural districts, but
at the same time, it limited the opportunity of incumbent legislators to
manipulate district lines as a means to entrench their own power.
If the Court in the reapportionment cases was principally concerned with
entrenchment, it could have invalidated only those malapportionments that
clearly demonstrated legislative efforts to entrench incumbents’ power.
This could have been accomplished through the very process-based
standard that Justice Clark advanced in his concurrences in Baker and
Reynolds, when he suggested that apportionment schemes should be struck
down when they were so “topsy-turvical” that they lacked any rational
design.294 This standard, which would have protected systems of
apportionment by subdivision, would have invalidated obvious examples of
entrenchment when legislators enact schemes that protect some political
subdivisions and not others, or give unequal representation to political
subdivisions for no rational reason.
In addition, if the Court were seeking to redress entrenchment problems,
it could have limited itself to striking down those malapportionments
resulting from the legislature’s failure to follow a state constitutional
mandate, which would be evidence of active entrenchment.295
Alternatively, it could have invalidated legislative codifications of
malapportionment when there were no feasible alternative political avenues
for a majority of the people to overturn these legislative judgments. The
unwillingness of the Court to limit its constitutional solution to correcting
the problem of entrenchment is evidence that the reapportionment cases
were about something more than fixing this particular process defect.
2. Antidiscrimination Review
The second role of representation-reinforcing judicial review that process
theory advances is the facilitation of the representation of minorities. The
courts do this by guarding against government decision making that is
motivated by hostility or prejudice toward a particular group. According to
process theory, it is appropriate to target these defects in the process of
government decision making, rather than the outcomes resulting from the

294. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964) (Clark, J. concurring); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
295. This was the situation in Tennessee prior to Baker. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER,
supra note 145, at 25 (“Tennessee’s state constitution of 1891 required equal representation
of populations.”).
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decision, because the requirement that laws treat everyone equally is
unattainable, and perhaps even unpalatable.296 When evaluating the
allocation of gratuitous benefits—benefits that are not constitutional
entitlements—the courts should therefore focus on correcting process
malfunctions indicated by government decisions motivated by dislike of a
particular group.297
This emphasis on correcting defects in government decision-making
processes is at the heart of the antidiscrimination principle, and it animates
the intent standard reaffirmed in the Davis trilogy. Courts that apply this
antidiscrimination principle to facially neutral laws scrutinize process
defects at two stages. First, they assess whether there is direct or
circumstantial evidence that the legislators were motivated by racial
considerations in adopting a law that disproportionately disadvantages a
racial minority.298 This is the basis for the intent standard. Second,
assuming such evidence demonstrates that the decision was race-based,
courts then evaluate whether a compelling government interest supports the
action, and if so, whether the action is narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest. This is the strict scrutiny standard that process
theorists have described as the handmaiden of motive review.299
Scholars that examine the vote dilution cases through a process-theoretic
lens try to fit them into this category of representation-reinforcing judicial
review.300 But there are two problems with such analyses: First, the
allocation of representation cannot accurately be described as a gratuitous
benefit that fits within this category of representation-reinforcing judicial
review. Second, and more importantly, categorizing the vote dilution cases
as instances of antidiscrimination review is based on a misunderstanding of
what challengers are required to prove in those cases. As I argued in Part I,
the Court, in cases like Whitcomb, White, Bolden, and Rogers, did not
scrutinize the challenged laws for indications that racial bias motivated their
adoption; nor did the Court subject the electoral schemes ultimately
invalidated in White and Rogers to strict scrutiny, which would have
required checking for a compelling interest or narrow tailoring at the back
end. Instead, the Court has invalidated electoral schemes once they are
shown to operate in a context that results in groups being deprived of the
effective opportunity to influence the political process.
Rather than correcting a process defect, the Court in its enforcement of
the representative equality principle is enforcing a substantive model of
democratic representation. The choice, for example, in the one-person, one296. See ELY, supra note 28, at 135–36.
297. See id. at 136.
298. For further analysis, see the discussion of the famous trilogy of cases beginning with
Davis in Part I.A; see also ELY, supra note 28, at 136–45 (describing the Court’s use of
motive analysis).
299. See infra Part I.A; see also ELY, supra note 28, at 145–46 (explaining how the strict
scrutiny analysis, applied to suspect classification, “function[s] as a handmaiden of
motivation analysis”).
300. See Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 276, at 709 (describing vote dilution claims as
being at “the intersection of the antientrenchment and the antidiscrimination rationales”).
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vote cases that the proper aggregation of votes in our representative
government is by population is a clear value judgment.301 It is a value
judgment that rejects other bases of aggregation, such as by geography,
which was utilized in the organization of the U.S. Senate and served as a
model for many states prior to the Court striking them down.302 Similarly,
the adoption of majority rule and effective representation for minorities was
a value judgment that subordinated a prior form of representative
government that had provided a minority veto to protect against majority
tyranny. This is essentially a judgment that the political marketplace is not
comprised of a monolithic majority that necessitates special protection for
minorities, but rather is comprised of many minorities whose opportunities
for coalition building should be facilitated.
Judicial enforcement of the representative equality principle therefore
enforces important substantive value judgments and does not fit neatly
within either form of representation-reinforcing judicial review. I argue in
the next subsection that what the Court is doing in these cases is engaging
in a form of representation-structuring judicial review. The value
judgments required for this form of review can be reconciled with process
theory, and ultimately with democracy itself, because they set up the critical
structural preconditions for representation-reinforcing judicial review—a
government that is in fact representative of all interests.
B. Representation-Structuring Judicial Review
Process theorists tend to overlook the pivotal role that courts have
played, and should continue to play, in securing the initial preconditions for
representation-reinforcing judicial review.303 In this role that I describe as
representation-structuring judicial review, the Court has enforced the
Constitution to structure the political marketplace so that majorities control
and marginalized minority interest groups are included and accounted
for.304 Ely did dedicate an oft-overlooked chapter in his book Democracy
301. Alexander Bickel, who was an opponent of the Court’s reapportionment decisions,
explained that “[w]ith respect to the apportionment problem . . . . [t]he issue [to be explored]
. . . is one of the distribution of access and power among various groups, and the answer
requires normative [value] choices and prophetic judgments.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 35 (1970).
302. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
303. See ELY, supra note 28, at 79 (noting that the republic the forebears envisioned was
“one in which the representatives would govern in the interest of the whole people”).
304. See id. at 77–78; Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV.
737, 741 (2004) (explaining that Ely’s concern was with fair majoritarianism and opening up
the “pluralist’s bazaar” to all comers). Bruce Ackerman, in a critique of the Carolene
Products process-theoretic account offers the following amended process-based argument of
what is required from the representative process that animates the discussion here:
[A]lthough each of us cannot always expect to convince our legislators, we can at
least insist that they treat our claims with respect. At the very least, they should
thoughtfully consider our moral and empirical arguments, rejecting them only after
conscientiously deciding that they are inconsistent with the public interest. If a
group fails to receive this treatment, it suffers a special wrong, one quite distinct
from its substantive treatment on the merits.
Ackerman, supra note 31, at 738.
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and Distrust to describing the court’s role in securing the structural
preconditions for representative government, but even he placed much more
emphasis on representation-reinforcing judicial review.305 Here I will focus
on this critical third function for judicial review and argue that it provides a
normative justification for the Court’s vote dilution doctrine.
The structural preconditions that Ely’s process theory describes for
representative government require a balancing of popular control with
egalitarianism. Ely described several forms of representation-structuring
judicial review to secure the structural preconditions for representative
government. These include judicial protection of the ballot and periodic
elections, the divisions of power between the three branches of the federal
government and between the federal government and the states, and the
virtual representation of politically disempowered individuals and groups
through the requirement of generally applicable laws.306 These forms of
judicial review fall outside of the Carolene Products footnote four
framework since they are not solely concerned with process. Instead, these
forms of judicial review necessarily involve the Court advancing
substantive value choices about the proper form of representative
government—one that balances majority rule with the equal treatment of
minorities in the political marketplace.
However, while Ely recognized the need to safeguard the structural preconditions for effective democratic representation, the judicial tools that he
offered for facilitating an inclusive and representative political marketplace
are underinclusive, both normatively and descriptively. Ely’s tendency was
to leave many of the problems of representative government to correction at
the back end through representation-reinforcing judicial review of alreadyenacted laws. But back-end review is limited. In particular, it cannot
ensure opportunities for politically marginalized minorities to have their
interests accounted for and considered in the political marketplace. Such
opportunities can, however, be protected through the representative equality
principle of effective representation. In the rest of this part, I describe the
three main roles that Ely offered for the Court in structuring the
representative process and show why they are not adequate for protecting
politically marginalized minorities in the political marketplace. I then show
how the Court’s enforcement of the representative equality principle fills
some of the gap in securing the equal treatment of minorities in the political
marketplace.
Ely set forth a clear role for the courts in securing a representative
government.307 In a representative government, the vote is fundamental.
Judicial safeguarding of the vote therefore represents more than simply the
prevention of self-entrenchment or the clearing of the channels of political
change. Without the ballot, there is no representative government. The
ballot and frequent elections provide the principal structural mechanism for

305. Ely, supra note 28, at 87–88.
306. Id. at 77–86.
307. Id. at 116–18.
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ensuring that the ruled control the rulers. If the rulers act contrary to the
interests of the ruled, the ruled can simply vote them out of office and
replace them with others that would better represent their interests.308 But
the vote only assures one aspect of representative government: majority
control. While voting and elections serve to ensure that the rulers are
accountable and responsive to the ruled, they do not necessarily guarantee
that the rulers are accountable and responsive to all segments of the ruled.
The rulers only really have to be responsive and accountable to a majority
of the ruled in order to secure reelection. Voting as a method of popular
control therefore provides little guarantee that the interests of minorities
will be accounted for and considered in the decision-making process. Ely
recognized this, explaining that since any majority can outvote the minority
in an election, there is nothing to guarantee that the minority’s votes will be
effective in securing representation in the political process.309
Ely therefore suggested a second means built into the Constitution itself
that helps reconcile popular control and the protection of minorities. This is
the constitutional division of powers vertically between the states and the
federal government and horizontally between the three branches of the
federal government.310 The Framers of the Constitution designed this
pluralism of governing structures to ensure that no majority faction would
be able to exert tyrannical control over all of the instruments of power.311
However, while these constitutionally embedded mechanisms may be
necessary, they are ultimately insufficient for protecting politically
marginalized minorities in a system premised on majority rule. Even
assuming that different majority coalitions control different parts of
government, there is little to ensure the protection of minorities that are not
part of the majority coalition at any level of the government. Instead, there
is the distinct possibility that these minorities will be marginalized from the
political marketplace at all levels of government in that their interests will
not be considered or accounted for in government decision-making
processes. This has been the case for African Americans for much of
American history.
Therefore, in addition to the vote and the division of power, Ely also
recognized the need in any theory of representation “to ensure . . . that the
representative would not sever his interest from those of a majority of his
constituency but also that he would not sever a majority coalition’s interests
from those of various minorities.”312 Toward this end, Ely pointed to a
third tool that contributes to the reconciliation of popular rule and

308. Id. at 78.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 80. Another strategy that the Founders employed to protect minorities was the
Bill of Rights. Ely recognized, however, that the problem with this strategy was that “[n]o
finite lists of entitlements can possibly cover all the ways majorities can tyrannize
minorities.” Id. at 81.
311. Id. at 80; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 206, at 268 (James Madison)
(discussing the division of powers as a means for “ambition . . . to counteract ambition”).
312. See ELY, supra note 28, at 82.

2012]

THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE

233

egalitarianism: virtual representation.313 According to the theory of virtual
representation, elected actors represent—through their support and
enactment of generally applicable laws—individuals that can vote as well as
those that cannot, because the interests of both parties are assumed to be
very nearly related, and most inseparably connected.314 The courts police
the process of virtual representation by invalidating any laws that are not
generally applicable, but that are instead biased in favor of one group over
another.315 This is perhaps the most promising avenue that Ely suggested
for ensuring attention to the interests of the politically marginalized. I
therefore explore it in some detail below.
McCulloch v. Maryland316 serves as the leading example of judicial
enforcement of the idea of virtual representation.317 In that case, the Bank
of the United States challenged the constitutionality of a state tax on the
operation of banks not chartered by the state.318 The Court invalidated the
tax, but conspicuously explained that the rationale did not extend to other
generally applicable real estate taxes to which the national bank was
subjected.319 According to process theory, this discrepancy can be
explained from the perspective of virtual representation. Through the
targeted tax on banks not chartered by the state, the state legislature had
severed the interests of the politically empowered state banks from the
politically powerless national bank through biased legislation that advanced

313. See id. at 82–87.
314. Edmund Burke famously explained:
[Members of the British House of Commons] cannot faithfully serve their
Constituents as legal Delegates, without favouring Non-Electors as virtual
Representatives, and must still promote the Interests of those which have no Vote,
by serving them well that gave them a Seat in the House, because the Interests of
both Parties, throughout the Kingdom, are very nearly related, and most
inseparably connected. Thus English Non-Electors are and ever must be virtually
represented and favoured, while Electors themselves are faithfully served.
REID, supra note 156, at 58 (quoting LOYAL PATRIOT, SOME OBSERVATIONS OF
CONSEQUENCE, IN THREE PARTS, OCCASIONED BY THE STAMP-TAX, LATELY IMPOSED ON THE
BRITISH COLONIES 23–24 (1768)); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 166 (1992) (describing virtual representation as the principal
British justification for the taxing of colonies without providing them with the opportunity to
elect members of Parliament); Michelman, supra note 173, at 51 (“Virtual representation
doctrine reached its ultimate synthesis as the British response to colonial objections against
taxation by a Parliament in which Americans were voiceless.”).
315. The Equal Protection Clause currently serves as the primary tool for providing
virtual representation through generally applicable laws. See ELY, supra note 28, at 86. But
prior to the Equal Protection Clause, the courts enforced the mandate of virtual
representation through the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Article I
Commerce Clause. Id. at 82–84. The courts have interpreted these two clauses to prohibit
states from treating politically powerless geographic outsiders less favorably than locals
when providing a set of entitlements. Id. at 84. Through this prohibition, the fate of the
locals with political power is tied to the fate of the politically powerless outsiders. And
through this tying of fates, the interests of the politically powerless are virtually represented
in a political process responsive to the politically empowered. Id. at 84.
316. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
317. ELY, supra note 28, at 85.
318. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 319.
319. Id.
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the interest of the state bank at the expense of the national bank. The
national bank that had already lacked actual representation in the state
legislature was now being denied virtual legislation as a result of the
enactment of the biased law.320
The biased tax law can be contrasted with a generally applicable real
estate tax that would impact the politically empowered state banks and the
politically powerless national bank equally. Such a generally applicable tax
offers a structural guarantee that the legislative decision-making process
would account for the national bank’s interests because of the need to be
accountable to the politically empowered state banks in the levying of the
tax.321 Thus, by policing the representative process for defects in virtual
representation, the courts could protect the politically powerless national
bank by ensuring that its interests were tied to the politically empowered
state bank.
Virtual representation is a promising tool for protecting the politically
marginalized. However, judicial invalidation of targeted laws that indicate
a breakdown of the system of virtual representation can still leave the
interests of the politically marginalized unaccounted for in the political
process.
In particular, a central assumption underlying virtual
representation is that there is a degree of homogeneity of interests between
the politically empowered and disempowered.322 For example, returning to
McCulloch, the interests of the politically powerless Bank of the United
States can be considered sufficiently protected when the state legislature
passes generally applicable laws if it is similarly situated to the politically
empowered state chartered banks. However, one can imagine a context in
which the politically empowered state bank is differently situated from the
politically powerless national bank such that a generally applicable law
would affect the two entities in fundamentally different ways.
Hypothetically, the state legislature’s adoption of a generally applicable real
estate tax on banks could ultimately bankrupt a financially weak and
politically powerless Bank of the United States, while allowing the more
financially sound and politically empowered state chartered banks to stay in
business. The state legislature might have enacted the law out of simple
320. ELY, supra note 28, at 86 (“[C]onstitutional salvation would have been found only in
a genuine guarantee of virtual representation.”).
321. See id.
322. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 314, at 168 (“Once a lack of natural identity of
interests between representatives and the populace was conceded, the idea of virtual
representation lost any force it might have had . . . .”); REID, supra note 156, at 60
(describing a major premise for the argument of virtual representation during the colonial
period as being that the Americans and British non-electors shared interests). Ely does not
ignore the fact that the interests of minorities will differ from those of members of the
majority coalition. See ELY, supra note 28, at 78 (arguing that the ballot “does not ensure . . .
the effective protection of minorities whose interests differ from the interests of most of the
rest of us”) (emphasis omitted). However, Ely suggested that these minorities are protected
through representation-reinforcing judicial review. See id. at 87. As I discuss further below,
such representation-reinforcing judicial review is not sufficient to protect against defects in
the structure of representative government that lead to the failure to consider the interests of
the minority in government decision-making processes.
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hostility to the national bank, but it may also be the case that it enacts laws
out of ignorance of, or indifference toward, the financial conditions and
circumstances of the national bank.
Even more distressing, one can imagine a predominantly white, southern
state legislature selected in elections in which their constituents vote in a
racially polarized manner such that the white constituents vote for
candidates responsive to their interests and never vote for candidates
responsive to the interests of the ethnic minority community. Members of
the state legislature selected in these contexts are likely to lack knowledge
of the interests of the minority community since they never campaigned in
their neighborhoods or asked for their votes in exchange for policies
responsive to their interests.
These divisions may leave the two
communities disconnected from each other such that the majority has little
knowledge of, or interest in, the conditions and circumstances that the
minority community faces.
When deciding upon and enacting generally applicable laws on matters
like public school funding, housing, and employment, legislators
representing these districts are less likely to account for and consider the
interests of the minority community. At the same time, societal divisions in
wealth, education, and employment as well as segregation in housing will
leave the majority and minority differently situated such that generally
applicable laws impact the two in fundamentally different ways. In these
circumstances, virtual representation alone will not ensure adequate
consideration of minority interests.
A potential objection to equating the national bank in McCulloch with
politically marginalized minorities in the United States today is that, for the
most part, members of the latter groups can actually vote.323 Presumably,
the need for virtual representation diminishes when the non-electors are
enfranchised because then they can secure actual representation by
threatening to vote elected officials out of office if they fail to serve their
interests.
To the extent that the political minority is an ordinary political minority
that has the opportunity to participate in the pluralist marketplace, this
threat is credible. Such minorities have the opportunity to form coalitions
with disaffected members of the majority coalition to secure actual
representation in the next election. Recognizing this potential, elected
officials have incentives to account for the interests of the ordinary minority
when making generally applicable public policy.
However, the distinction between being able to vote and not being able to
vote for purposes of securing actual representation dissolves when the
minority is politically marginalized. For these minorities, the threat to vote
individuals out of office is not credible because societal animus or social
323. For example, the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act enabled racial
minorities to vote, and the elimination of property qualifications and other wealth restrictions
assured voting rights for poor people. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 211–12, 218–21 (2000)
(describing these changes and their impact).
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isolation prevents them from forming the necessary coalitions to influence
elections unless they happen to comprise a majority in a particular
jurisdiction.324 These politically marginalized minorities face a political
context in which voting is polarized and candidates for office can appeal
exclusively to the majority community to win elections.325 These
candidates for office experience no electoral costs for failing to learn about
the needs and interests of the minority community or even for failing to
campaign for votes from these groups. When animus toward the minority
group is particularly strong, the majority may even punish candidates that
attempt to develop a platform that recognizes the interests of the minority.
This can carry over to the policymaking domain, where elected officials
negotiate and enact generally applicable laws that do not account for the
needs and interests of the politically marginalized minority community.326
Thus, with respect to the politically marginalized minority, the vote is
rendered essentially meaningless.
But even assuming that the politically marginalized are not virtually
represented in the political process, an argument can be made that
representation-reinforcing judicial review is sufficient to ensure that they
are being treated with equal concern and respect. Specifically, process
theory suggests that the courts should invalidate laws passed out of simple
hostility to a minority group.327 As discussed above, this is the explanation
for judicial scrutiny of the motivation of decision makers under the Equal
Protection Clause.328 The problem with this fallback option is that scrutiny
of laws motivated by discrimination cannot adequately compensate for a
political process that is not truly representative. In particular, it cannot
correct for the infirmity in the representative process that results in laws
passed out of ignorance and without consideration of the interests of the
politically marginalized minorities who are neither virtually nor actually
represented in the political process. Government decision makers’
ignorance of the interests of the minority can be just as harmful to that
group as hostility toward that minority.
Stronger representation-structuring tools are therefore necessary to
reconcile the tension between popular control and egalitarianism. Judicial
enforcement of the representative equality principle should be seen as one
such tool. Through this tool, the Court has simultaneously enforced both
majority rule and effective minority representation.329 It has enforced the
324. See supra notes 252–63 and accompanying text (describing the degree of societal
animus and social isolation that African Americans and Mexican Americans faced in two
counties in Texas).
325. See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights
Initiative, University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 665 (2006)
(finding that since 1982, “[o]f the lawsuits analyzed, 155 considered the extent of racially
polarized voting, 105 found the factor to exist”).
326. Id. at 722–27 (surveying the degree of lack of responsiveness to minority
communities identified in Voting Rights Act litigation).
327. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part II.B–C.
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requirement that popular control be maintained through districts that are
equally apportioned.330 At the same time, the Court has secured the
accommodation of minority interests within the mandate of majority rule by
invalidating districting arrangements that exclude the politically
marginalized from the pluralist marketplace.331 In doing so, courts have
forced jurisdictions to structure their districts in a way that provides
opportunities for representation in the political process for politically
marginalized minorities. This has produced a greater likelihood that the
interests of the marginalized will be accounted for in government decision
making.
This judicial provision of opportunities for representation of all interests
does not mean that every interest is guaranteed a group representative in
office.
The problem that representation-structuring judicial review
responds to is that of the politically marginalized minorities’ lack of access
to the political process as a result of either societal animus toward them or
simpe ignorance about their existence or needs. Those factors lead
candidates and elected officials to not be particularly responsive to minority
interests when running for office or when making policy once in office.332
Enforcement of the representative equality principle guarantees that some
of the political candidates for any particular governing body will have to
account for and perhaps appeal to the interests of the politically
marginalized minority group. And once in office, at least some elected
officials in that political body will have to bring into consideration the
interests of the politically marginalized in the policymaking process to have
any hopes of securing reelection. This does not mean that the political body
must pass laws favorable to the politically marginalized, but it should
produce public policies that, at a minimum, compare favorably to what was
enacted prior to the recognition of the particular group’s interests.
The role of the courts in ensuring a government representative of all
interests is, therefore, to remove electoral barriers that result in minority
exclusion and force states to erect electoral structures that will remedy this
deprivation. Performing these functions is perfectly consistent with the
judicial role in structuring representative government that is outlined in
process theory, because it reconciles egalitarianism with popular control.
This is what the courts have been doing in the vote dilution cases.
Reexamining Rogers through this expanded process-theoretic lens, it
becomes clear that the factors that the Court considered relevant in
assessing the constitutionality of the at-large district are ones that go to the
questions of the political marginalization of the minority group and the
level of access it has to the political process. Racially polarized voting, and
330. See supra notes 200–05 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 251–60 and accompanying text.
332. For example, during the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 2006, Congress
documented the continued persistence of racially polarized voting and the general
unresponsiveness of state and local legislators to minority communities in several
jurisdictions. See generally To Examine the Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005).
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particularly the unwillingness of whites to vote for minority-preferred
candidates, evidenced the political marginalization of the African American
community in Burke County, Georgia.333 Moreover, the political party
system of competition for votes had broken down. This competitive system
could ordinarily be relied upon to create opportunities for access to the
political process for minority communities, since one party or the other
would likely account for their interests.334 In Burke County, however, one
party dominated.335 Therefore, it could exclude politically marginalized
groups from involvement in the candidate slating process without any
electoral repercussions. And candidates for this party did not have to
compete for the votes of groups excluded from the political coalition
because of societal animus or ignorance. The result was a Burke County
Board of Commissioners comprised of elected officials that were generally
unresponsive to the needs and interests of the politically marginalized black
community.
In the policymaking process, road paving in black
neighborhoods likely never made it onto the agenda, and complaints about
An
school and grand jury segregation were likely ignored.336
unrepresentative process of selection therefore contributed to
unrepresentative policymaking.
While the Court could not correct the underlying societal animus, it could
correct the structural defect that led to the unrepresentative process. And it
did so, of course, by invalidating the at-large structure.337 This forced
Burke County to replace the at-large structure with single-member electoral
districts, some of which would provide the politically marginalized group
with an opportunity to influence electoral outcomes.338 Most importantly,
these districts would serve the process-theoretic value of ensuring that
minority interests are treated with equal concern and respect in the political
marketplace. This value is at the heart of the constitutional representative
equality principle and central to the reconciliation of popular control and
egalitarianism.
CONCLUSION
The intent standard under the Equal Protection Clause is not universally
applicable to all claims brought under the clause. While the Court, in much
of its equal protection jurisprudence, has limited its review to laws
motivated by discrimination, in an important set of cases it has not. In this
latter set of cases, the Court has invalidated laws that are not motivated by
bias but operate in a manner that is inconsistent with two judicially derived
333. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
334. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 100–01 (1957)
(describing how losing parties revise their political platforms to attract the supporters of the
winning party).
335. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
338. McDonald et al., supra note 2, at 84 (“[M]any jurisdictions in Georgia and
throughout the South have bowed to the inevitable and have adopted less dilutive forms of
elections.”).
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principles of representative equality: majority rule and opportunities for
effective representation of minority groups. Electoral structures that
provide a single powerful minority control over the political process in the
form of a veto, or that deprive a politically marginalized minority group of
the opportunity to influence government decision making are not
appropriately considered representative.
This alternative framework for evaluating challenges to electoral
structures has important implications for the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act. The Act, rather than simply being seen as a vehicle that is
enforcing a constitutional antidiscrimination requirement, should also be
seen as one enforcing the constitutional principle of representative equality.
When assessing the constitutionality of the Act from this perspective, it
therefore should matter much less that the Act is focused on the results of
electoral schemes and not on their process of adoption. It also should
matter much less that the Act sometimes requires that states engage in raceconscious decision making to secure the effective representation of minority
groups. Reliance on race in the drawing of district lines may be in tension
with the antidiscrimination principle, but it is often necessary to secure the
critical preconditions for representative government to operate in the first
place. And in this clash of constitutional principles, the establishment of
the preconditions for representative government should ordinarily supersede
the antidiscrimination mandate.

